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Abstract 
We analyze the link between creditor rights and firms’ investment policies, proposing 
that stronger creditor rights in bankruptcy reduce corporate risk-taking. In cross-country 
analysis, we find that stronger creditor rights induce greater propensity of firms to engage 
in diversifying acquisitions, which result in poorer operating and stock-market abnormal 
performance.  In countries with strong creditor rights, firms also have lower cash flow 
risk and lower leverage, and there is greater propensity of firms with low-recovery assets 
to acquire targets with high-recovery assets. These relationships are strongest in countries 
where management is dismissed in reorganization, and are observed in time-series 
analysis around changes in creditor rights.  Our results question the value of strong 
creditor rights as they have an adverse effect on firms by inhibiting management from 
undertaking risky investments.   
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1. Introduction  
 
Through history, default on debt incurred harsh punishment.  In biblical time and in 
ancient Greece, defaulted debtors were enslaved for a number of years or until the debt 
was fully discharged and during some periods in Rome, default met with physical 
punishment.1  The United Kingdom had debtors’ prisons until their abolishment in the 
1869 Debtors Act.   Now, the norm of limited liability reduces creditor rights by limiting 
the ability to purse debtors when they default on promised payments.2 Smith and Warner 
(1979) document that creditors impose restrictions on financial policies of firms through 
covenants, even prior to default, in order to control managerial actions that could reduce 
firm value.  But Schwartz (1997, p. 127) points out: “When a firm becomes insolvent, 
however, the state-supplied dispute resolution procedure—the bankruptcy system and 
court—is mandatory; parties cannot contract in the lending agreement for an alternative 
procedure.”  This means that bankruptcy laws which uniformly apply to all firms and 
have precedence over private firm-specific contracts may lead to inefficient outcomes for 
some firms.3   
In this paper, we study the effect of creditor rights in bankruptcy on corporate 
risk-taking.  In particular, we ask:  What effect does the strength of creditor rights have 
on firms’ investment decisions? While a harsh penalty in default reduces fraud and 
opportunistic behavior by debtors, might it also inhibit entrepreneurial, bona-fide risky 
investment?  
Research on creditor rights mainly analyzes their effect on financing policies. For 
example, Djankov, McLeish, and Shleifer (2007, 2008)  find that stronger creditor rights 
encourage greater supply of credit as measured by aggregate lending.4 This evidence  
supports the view that strong creditor rights help expand the financing capacity of firms 
                                                 
1 In 450 BC: The Twelve Tablets, Section III, Debt. Penalties ranged from imprisonment to extracting part of the body. 
2 Europe still has relatively stricter penalties upon bankruptcy, as noted in The Economist, 23 March 2002, Fear of 
Failure – Europe’s fear of bankruptcie: “In Europe, by contrast [to the United States], failed firms face bigger hurdles.  
First, in the continent that created the debtor’s prison, insolvency is still tainted with moral failure.  In some countries, 
company directors are personally liable for bankruptcy. That steeply raises the penalties for failure – and so deters 
entrepreneurs from taking risks.” 
3 This is why Schwartz (1997) proposes that the state avails to firms a menu of several bankruptcy procedures. Then, 
allowing parties flexibility in contracting for preferred bankruptcy procedures alleviates underinvestment arising due to 
strong creditor rights. 
4Haselmann, Pistor and Vig (2006) find that the improvement in enforcement of creditor rights in Central and East 
European countries through the creation of a collateral registry boosted lending.  
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by limiting the ability of owners to opportunistically expropriate firm value, and thereby 
reduce the costs that result from the conflict of interests between owners and providers of 
debt capital (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Other studies, such as Acharya, Sundaram 
and John (2004) show theoretically and empirically that corporate leverage responds 
negatively to stronger creditor rights, relatively more so for firms with greater specificity 
of assets. Vig (2007) finds that in India, improvement in the rights of secured creditors 
lowered the usage of secured corporate debt. 
In contrast, this paper studies the link between creditor rights and corporate 
investment policy, and the effect of creditor rights on firms’ demand for credit. We 
propose that stronger creditor rights induce firms to make risk-reducing investments such 
as diversifying acquisitions that are potentially inefficient and value-reducing. The reason 
is that strong creditor rights in default can lead to inefficient liquidation that extinguishes 
the continuation option of firm’s enterprise and hurts stockholders. Also, creditor rights 
that mandate the dismissal of management impose an additional private cost on 
managers. To avoid these costs, shareholders and managers lower the likelihood of 
distress by diversifying or reducing cash flow risk. Such risk reduction can result in value 
loss and foregoing of profitable investments, and thereby strong creditor rights can result 
in dead-weight costs to firms and to the economy at large.  We also propose that while 
stronger creditor rights increase the propensity to lend, they may reduce the firms’ 
willingness to borrow, resulting in lower overall level of corporate debt. 
Our empirical analysis studies the effects of creditor rights on the risk-taking 
activities of firms. We use as an explanatory variable the variation of creditor rights 
across countries in their bankruptcy codes, documented by La Porta et al. (1998), which 
are largely a function of the country’s legal origin and exogenous to the nature of the 
country’s overall corporate investments.  
We employ several different measures of corporate risk-taking and examine their 
relationship to creditor rights across countries and over time.  We find the following:  
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(1) Stronger creditor rights in a country are associated with a greater propensity to do 
diversifying acquisitions, across industries as well as across countries.5  The 
value effect of diversifying acquisitions – as measured by abnormal stock-market 
returns at the acquisition announcement – is negative for countries with stronger 
creditor rights. And, diversifying acquisitions in countries with stronger creditor 
rights are associated with lower subsequent profitability, measured by the return 
on assets (ROA).  These results are obtained after accounting for the selection of 
the type of acquisition (diversifying or focusing) by the firm.  Such negative 
value and operating performance effects associated with stronger creditor rights 
are not observed for focusing acquisitions. 
 
(2) In countries with stronger creditor rights, firms choose a mode of operation that 
reduces cash flow risk, measured by the standard deviation of firms’ ROA.   
 
We obtain these results both in tests at the level of individual acquisitions or firms 
and at an aggregate country level.  Overall, these results are strongest (statistically as well 
as economically) for the creditor rights corresponding to (i) whether there is no automatic 
stay on the debtor’s assets in bankruptcy  and (ii) whether management is dismissed in 
bankruptcy.  For example, dismissal in bankruptcy reduces the likelihood of a merger 
being in the same industry by 6.6% (based on Table 3) where the standard deviation of 
this likelihood across countries is 10.3%, and it lowers the cash flow risk measured at the 
country level by around 3% (based on Table 5), where the cross-country standard 
deviation of cash flow risk is 2%. Thus, the effect of creditor rights on corporate 
investment policy and corporate risk taking seems large. We also examine the effect of 
creditor rights at the industry level because countries differ in the composition of their 
industries, and industries may differ in the propensity to diversify or reduce risk. We 
obtain that the findings in (1) and (2) above still hold. In addition, we find that 
 
                                                 
5 We focus on M&As because they provide a unique opportunity to observe a major corporate investment and its effect 
on corporate risk – whether the acquisition is diversifying (across industries) or focusing (within-industry).  In M&As, 
we can also identify whether the assets in which the company invests are of high or low recovery value.  Also 
important for our setting, corporate investment in the form of M&A decisions is not tainted by cross-country 
differences in reporting practices that affect other measures of investment such as capital expenditures and R&D.  
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(3) In countries with stronger creditor rights, companies have lower financial 
leverage, after controlling for both country-level and firm-level variables that 
affect leverage. These results are notable because proponents of stronger creditor 
rights posit that they have a positive effect on lending. However, stronger 
creditor rights may inhibit borrowing, resulting in overall lower corporate 
leverage.  
 
(4) In countries with strong creditor rights, target firms whose assets have high 
recovery value in default6 (or distress) are more likely to be acquired by firms 
whose assets have low recovery value. This is because a high recovery value of 
assets enables firms in distress to defer default by liquidating some of these assets 
and using the proceeds to service debt.  Thus, by acquiring a high-recovery 
target, a low-recovery firm reduces or defers the likelihood of default in case of 
distress. 
 
(5) Finally, all of the above effects of stronger creditor rights – greater propensity to 
engage in diversifying acquisitions, the resulting reduced value and operating 
performance, lower cash flow risk, lower financial leverage, and greater 
propensity of low recovery firms to acquire high recovery targets – are also 
observed with a strengthening (and vice-versa for weakening) of a country’s 
creditor rights. 
The corporate choice of risk affects corporate value because if managers seek to 
reduce risk in countries with strong creditor rights, they may choose to diversify even if 
that does hurts firm value. The effect of corporate diversification on corporate value is a 
subject of debate.  For example, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), Comment and 
Jarrell (1995) and Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) show that diversifying mergers 
result in reduction in value.  Moreover, Berger and Ofek (1995) show that diversified 
conglomerates have significant value discount compared to the conglomerate’s imputed 
                                                 
6 Assets with high recovery value have lower costs of liquidation. These assets lose less of their value in distressed 
sales and, following the definition of Shleifer and Vishny (1992), have lower specificity in that they are fungible across 
industries and hence trade at prices that are close to their value in best use. Our exact measure of high-recovery 
industries is based on the realized recovery rates on debt of defaulted firms in different industries documented by 
Acharya, Bharath and Srinivasan (2007). 
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value if its divisions were valued according to their standalone counterparts in the 
industry. However, Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004) find that the 
diversification discount disappears after addressing endogeneity econometrically, which 
means that business segments acquired by conglomerates are inferior to their industry’s 
standalone counterparts.  These results are recently overturned by Ammann, Hoechle and 
Schmid (2008), Laeven and Levine (2007) and Schmid and Walter (2009) who affirm the 
existence of a discount in industrial and financial conglomerates. 
Diversification can be beneficial in countries with under-developed capital 
markets, because internal capital markets in conglomerates may substitute for outside 
capital markets, helping to overcome the problems of asymmetric information and moral 
hazard that limit external finance.  But conglomerates may also reduce value because of 
inefficient subsidization of poorly performing groups by better performing ones, in what  
Scharfstein and Stein (2002) call the “dark side” of internal capital markets.  Indeed 
Berger and Ofek (1995) find that conglomerates overinvest in segments whose industry 
has poor investment opportunity, and Lamont (1997), Scharfstein (1998), Shin and Stulz 
(1998), Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) and Lamont and Polk (2002) find evidence of 
inefficient investment in conglomerates.  Comment and Jarrell (1995, p. 68) also question 
the link between conglomerates and internal capital markets, showing that “diversified 
firms do not rely any less on external capital market transactions” than do undiversified 
firms.7  
The effect of conglomeration is also debatable in emerging markets where 
external capital markets malfunction.  Khanna and Palepu (2000) find that in India, most 
diversified business groups add value, measured by Tobin’s q, which contrasts the results 
obtained in the U.S.8  However, Lins and Servaes (2002) reject the theory on the benefits 
of internal capital markets. They analyze over 1000 firms from seven emerging markets 
in 1995 and find that diversification leads to discount. Lee, Peng and Lee (2008), who 
                                                 
7 However, there is some ongoing debate here too. Analyzing plant-level data, Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) suggest 
that the conglomerate discount results from lower productivity of some peripheral segments, whereas its main segments 
are as efficient as their stand-alone industry counterparts. This, in their view, implies that the conglomerate discount is 
endogenous and not a result of agency problems. 
8 Analyzing 1309 Indian firms in 1993 which are about equally divided between diversified and focused firms, Khanna 
and Palepu (2000, p. 887): “Firms affiliated with a large majority of diversified Indian business groups have lower 
Tobin’s q measures than unaffiliated focused firms, but those firms affiliated with the most highly diversified Indian 
business groups have higher Tobin’s q measures than all the other firms in the economy.” 
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study business groups (chaebols) in Korea over the period 1984-1996, find that the effect 
of diversification on value has changed over time. In the early period, the extent of 
diversification in the business groups was value increasing, whereas in the more recent 
period diversification led to a discount. They explain this change by improvements in the 
institutional setting: liberalization of capital markets and transitions in the product and 
labor markets, have made internal capital markets less important for raising capital. 
Notably, the recent period in the study of Lee et al., where diversification discount exists, 
corresponds to the beginning of our study’s sample period.  Our study tests directly the 
consequences of diversifying acquisitions as a function of the country’s creditor rights. 
 
Relation to earlier studies on the effects of creditor rights. On the theoretical 
front, Adler (1992) suggests that while strong creditor rights induce the manager to 
increase the firm’s risk as the firm approaches default, their ex-ante effect is to reduce 
risk to avoid insolvency.  Manso (2005) proposes that penalizing failing entrepreneurs, 
for example, through tough bankruptcy procedures, inhibits innovation.  Acharya and 
Subramanian (2009b) also argue theoretically that strong creditor rights can deter 
financial leverage and risk taking in industries that are inherently more innovative.  
Adler, Capcun and Weiss (2007) propose that the recent strengthening of creditor rights 
in the U.S. has induced firms to delay default, which could destroy value.  Our empirical 
evidence is consistent with the ex-ante risk-reducing effect of strong creditor rights, 
assumed in this literature. 
Empirically, Acharya and Subramanian (2009a) find that in countries with 
stronger creditor rights, technologically innovative industries innovate less, employ lower 
financial leverage, and importantly for welfare conclusions, also grow slower.9 Chava 
and Roberts (2008) and Nini, Smith and Sufi (2008) find that restrictive debt covenants 
and enforcement of covenant violations, which provide firm-specific creditor rights, 
inhibit capital investment.  These findings point at potentially harmful effects of creditor 
rights for risky investment.  
                                                 
9 There is an inverse relationship between the strictness of personal bankruptcy laws and entrepreneurship, as reflected 
in the extent of self employment. See Fan and White (2004) and Armour and Cumming (2005). 
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Our findings that diversification is driven by the managerial agency problem is 
consistent with Amihud and Lev’s (1981) suggestion that diversification may reflect 
managerial motivation to reduce risk rather than a value-maximizing decision.10  Tufano 
(1996) studies hedging by 50 publicly traded gold-mining firms in the U.S. and Canada 
and finds that firms with greater managerial stock ownership hedge more, suggesting that 
managerial risk-aversion drives hedging. Tufano (1998) suggests an alternative channel 
whereby hedging benefits management by reducing the discipline imposed by accessing 
external capital markets for finance.   
 The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a model that motivates 
the causal effect of creditor rights on corporate investment choice. Section 3 discusses the 
data and empirical design and presents the results of our tests. Section 4 offers 
concluding remarks.  
 
2. Theoretical motivation 
 
We present a stylized model to analyze the effect of creditor rights on owner-
manager’s risk-taking incentives. The model examines the effect of reorganization 
outcomes for management and shareholders of a distressed firm on the ex-ante 
investments of the firm. Figure 1 presents the time-line of the model.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE. 
 
Consider a firm at date 0 that is run by an owner/entrepreneur (the “manager” of 
the firm).  The firm has made some past investment (say I units) and has some existing 
debt in place of face value F which is maturing at date 1.11  The manager owns all equity 
of the firm.  The manager can choose at date 0 the risk of the firm’s future cash flows to 
be realized from this investment at date 1. We adopt the technology for choice of risk 
from a part of the banking literature, starting with the models of Blum (1999, 2002) and 
                                                 
10 Comment and Jarrell (1995) show that focused firms (firms whose revenue is concentrated in a fewer business 
segments) have significantly higher idiosyncratic risk.  Hence, diversifying acquisitions are known to reduce risk by 
reducing revenue concentration but their incidence has not yet been linked to the strength of creditor rights.   
11 We do not model the choice of leverage, but we control for potential endogeneity of leverage to creditor rights.   
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Allen and Gale (2000).  The risk choices at date 0 are indexed by y ≥ 0, which represents 
the firm’s cash flow in case the investment succeeds at date 1. Success is likely with 
probability p(y), where 0 < p(y) < 1, p’(y) < 0, and p’’(y) < 0.  With remaining 
likelihood, [1 – p(y)], the investment fails at date 1 and produces cash flow of zero. Thus, 
y is also an index for the risk of default of the firm:  Greater y reduces the likelihood of 
success p(y) (in a concave fashion).  Agents are risk-neutral and the risk-free rate of 
interest is zero. 
At date 0, the owner/manager makes the choice of risk, maximizing equity value 
net of creditor payments, and anticipating the outcomes from resolution of distress (if 
any) at date 1.   
In case of default at date 1, the continuation prospects of the firm depend upon 
managerial ability. Managerial ability at date 1 may be either high or low with equal 
probabilities.  We assume that neither the manager nor the firm’s board of directors that  
hires her know this ability unless it is investigated at date 1, as we explain below.  Also, 
for simplicity, we assume that managerial ability does not affect the date-0 investment.  
In other words, managers are assumed to be randomly endowed at date 1 to be high or 
low type with equal likelihood. Managerial ability does affect firm’s outcomes at date 1 
in case of default.  In particular, if there is default at date 1, then a firm operating under a 
high-ability manager yields cash flow of H while a low-ability manager yields zero cash 
flow.  If the firm is liquidated to outsiders and ceases to exist, it will fetch cash flow of L.  
We assume that 2L < F < H.   
These assumptions on managerial ability are arguably simplistic, but they offer 
the following advantages.  First, they rule out signaling of ability by managers through 
the choice of risk.  Second, they also rule out learning by firms about ability of managers 
through first-period outcomes.  Third, and more importantly, they capture the notion of 
“ability” in that if the firm ends up in default at date 1 (which is outside of managerial 
control given the choice of risk at date 0), then the type of manager affects the firm’s 
ability to turn around.   
Consistent with managerial type being most relevant when firm is in default, any 
investigations of this type also occur only in distress. The following are the possible 
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outcomes upon default at date 1, which occurs if the realization from the investment is 
zero: 
 
(1) With probability r (r > 0), the firm is liquidated to outsiders by creditors, which 
yields L.  This may occur due to failure amongst the different creditors of the firm 
to agree on a reorganization outcome (we discuss below possible explanations for 
such a failure). 
(2) With probability q (q > 0), creditors investigate the type of management and find 
it out. Then, if the manager’s ability is found to be low, the manager is dismissed 
and the firm is liquidated, realizing cash flow of L. If the manager’s ability is 
found to be high, the firm continues with the current manager and realizes cash 
flow H. The likelihood of each such event occurring is 0.5. 
(3) With the remaining probability of (1 – q – r) (assumed positive), creditors are 
unable to learn managerial type. If the firm continues with the current manager, 
the cash flows are H or 0 with probability of 0.5. If H is sufficiently high 
compared to proceeds from liquidation (we assumed that 0.5H > L), creditors are 
better off if the firm continues compared to liquidation even if the manager type 
in unknown. Therefore, creditors agree to a reorganization proceeding with the 
current manager. Notably, if the manager turns out to be of bad type, assets that 
are used for one more period have depreciated and become worthless. Thus, 
continuing for another period makes the firm forego the ability to liquidate the 
assets to outsiders for L.   
 
Assumption (2) is consistent with empirical evidence.  For example, Eckbo and 
Thornburn (2003) find that in Sweden, where creditor rights include the automatic firing 
of the manager in default, the rehiring probability of dismissed managers increases in a 
measure of managerial ability.12 
                                                 
12 In particular, Eckbo and Thornburn (2003) find that managerial ability (based on trustee assessment that the 
bankruptcy was not due to managerial incompetence or economic crime) is increasing in the firm industry-adjusted pre-
bankruptcy operating performance and the recovery rate of its debt, and decreasing in the trustee’s evaluation of the 
manager and in the delay from insolvency to filing. 
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If manager is found to be of low ability and is dismissed (probability of 0.5q) or 
the firm fails to reorganize and is liquidated (probability of r), managers are assumed to 
suffer a private or personal cost of m > 0 due to loss of reputation or private benefits of 
control.  This assumption is consistent with empirical evidence.  Gilson (1989), Baird and 
Rasmussen (2006) and Ozelge (2007) find that upon distress, there is a significantly 
higher probability of top-management dismissal, especially due to direct intervention by 
lending banks, compared to firms not in distress. Gilson documents that the likelihood of 
managerial dismissal in leveraged firms following adverse stock performance is almost 
thrice as high as that in firms that are not distressed, and that managers dismissed in 
distress suffer a significant private cost in the form of diminished future employment 
opportunities. Eckbo and Thornburn (2003) also find that in Sweden, managers of 
bankrupt companies suffer a median (abnormal) income loss of 47%.  We also assume 
that business failure which might occur if a low-quality manager continues does not incur 
the cost m that is incurred as a result of forced dismissal by creditors. And, if the firm 
continues without knowing the manager’s ability (with probability 0.5(1 – q – r)) and the 
manager turns out to be of low ability, we assume for simplicity that the manager has 
received private benefits of control for one additional period which offset the private cost 
suffered when the type is revealed at the end.  
The assumed inefficiency in reorganization, which leads to liquidation rather than 
continuation, reflects creditors’ failure to reach an agreement amongst themselves 
regarding bankruptcy proceedings.  For example, suppose that firm’s debt of face value F 
consists of secured debt of amount F1 and unsecured debt of amount (F - F1), where F1 < 
L. Suppose also that secured creditors have claim to all assets of the firm and there is no 
automatic stay on secured creditors’ rights. Then, because secured creditors are fully 
covered under liquidation but face some default risk in case firm is continued (and 
managerial type turns out to be low), they have incentives to liquidate the firm. In 
contrast, unsecured creditors value the continuation outcome. Thus, there is a conflict of 
interest amongst creditors whether to expend any time and effort in learning about 
managerial type at all: secured creditors may just prefer to seize and liquidate the assets. 
Such reorganization failure is also more likely if reorganization petition requires majority 
consent of creditors and secured (or more generally, senior) creditors can block 
11 
 
continuation in favor of liquidation. Another possibility (outside of our model) is that 
firm’s continuation requires additional financing, but due to debt overhang problem, this 
can be raised only if the firm can arrange supra-priority financing, such as the debtor-in-
possession financing in the United States. However, if creditor rights do not allow 
secured creditors’ claims to be subordinated in this way, then no continuation may be 
feasible, resulting in liquidation of the firm. 
We assume that the probabilities q and r reflect the law on creditor rights in 
which the firm operates.  These parameters map directly into their empirical counterparts 
of creditor right scores (as measured, for example, in LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1998)).  The empirical counterpart for q is the score MANAGES, which 
equals 1 if management is dismissed in bankruptcy.  The counterpart for r is the set of 
other creditor right scores, namely AUTOSTAY, SECURED and REORG.  These 
correspond to there being no automatic stay on assets of the debtor in bankruptcy (so that 
creditors can seize assets right away if they wish to), secured creditors being paid first, 
and reorganization requiring creditors’ consent, which as explained above could lead to 
failure to reorganize due to disagreement amongst creditors.13 In our model, while the 
creditor right to dismiss management leads to more information about managerial type 
and therefore better continuation and liquidation decisions, the other three creditor rights 
may result in inefficient liquidations of the firm. However, all these creditor rights 
impose a private cost on management and induce in them aversion to risk (even though 
they are endowed with a risk-neutral preference in our model). We derive this result next. 
 In the presence of leverage and risk of default, the owner/manager chooses the 
risk y to maximize the expected value of equity net of the private costs from distress, 
given as: 
p(y) [y – F] + [1 – p(y)] [  – (r + 0.5 q) m + (0.5 q + 0.5(1 – q  – r)) (H – F) ]. (1) 
This expression reflects the fact that management suffers a private cost m when the firm 
is liquidated – either due to failure to reorganize or due to revelation of his type being 
low - and has residual value in distress in other cases provided there is excess cash flow 
after creditors are paid off. This latter scenario has a probability of (0.5 q + 0.5(1 – q –r)) 
                                                 
13 Schwartz (2001, p. 128) points out that “without a bankruptcy procedure, creditors acting individually may force 
liquidations, thereby preventing the reorganization of viable but temporarily insolvent firms.” 
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because there is excess cash flow after paying creditors only if managerial type is 
discovered by creditors to be high and firm is continued (probability of 0.5 q) or if 
managerial type is not discovered but it turns out ex post to be high. 
The optimal choice of risk for the levered firm y* is thus given by the first-order 
condition: 
p(y) + p’(y) [ y – F + (r + 0.5 q) m – 0.5 (1 – r) (H – F) ] = 0 ,               (2) 
and, the second-order derivative is 
 2 p’(y) + p’’(y) [ y – F + (r + 0.5 q) m – 0.5 (1  – r) (H – F)] .                (3) 
Note that p’(y) < 0 at the optimal risk choice y*, so we must have  
[ y – F + (r + 0.5 q) m – 0.5 (1  – r) (H – F)]  > 0 ,           (4) 
so that the second-order derivative above is negative and the first-order condition indeed 
gives the optimum that maximizes the objective of manager.  To see this, note that 
because p(y) > 0 and p’(y) < 0, the expression p(y) + p’(y) [y – x] is greater than zero for 
all y ≤ x. Hence, the solution to the equation p(y) + p’(y) [y – x] = 0 must satisfy y > x. 
 The three terms after y inside [.] in the condition (4) for y* illustrate the additional 
effects on risk-taking for a levered firm.  The first term, –F, reflects the fact that a levered 
firm has incentives to shift risk given equity’s “option” like payoff at date 1.  This effect 
is not however sensitive to creditor right parameters q and r. The second term (r + 0.5 
q)m reflects the risk-aversion induced in managerial objective by the fact that 
management suffers a private cost upon being dismissed. The manager is risk neutral, but 
the personal cost that he endures because of dismissal in bankruptcy makes his reward 
function concave, making him averse to risk.   This effect is increasing in r, the failure of 
creditors to agree on reorganization, and also increasing in q, the likelihood that 
management is dismissed in bankruptcy, both assumed to be a property of the creditor 
rights of the country.  The third term – 0.5 (1 – r) (H – F) also corresponds to a risk-
shifting incentive.  This is the “option” effect from date 2 when the firm is continued.  
Crucially, the magnitude of this effect diminishes in r, the likelihood that creditors fail to 
allow the firm to efficiently reorganize in bankruptcy. 
 To summarize, creditor rights that enable dismissal of management in bankruptcy 
and that are less likely to lead to a reorganization outcome discourage ex-ante risk-taking 
by firm’s management.    
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We prove these two results formally as follows. Denoting the first-order condition 
for management’s optimization as f (y*(q,r), q, r) = 0, the second-order condition implies 
δf / δy < 0.  In turn, taking the derivative of f with respect to q or r, and applying the 
implicit-function theorem gives 
(i) sign (dy* / dq) = sign (δf / δq), which is negative because          (5) 
δf / δq = p’(y) m < 0,  
and, similarly, 
(ii) sign (dy* / dr) = sign (δf / δr), which is also negative because         (6) 
δf / δr = p’(y) [ m + 0.5 (H  – F)] < 0. 
Thus, the risk that a levered firm undertakes declines in the likelihood that management 
is dismissed in bankruptcy and that reorganizations promoting continuations of the firm 
do not materialize. These two implications constitute the foundation of our empirical 
investigation. 
 
3. Hypotheses, Data and Empirical Design  
 
Motivated by the model’s results, we examine the following five hypotheses 
concerning the effects of creditor rights on corporate propensity to take risk by testing 
four hypotheses, using data on corporate behavior and creditor rights from 38 countries.   
 
Hypothesis I: The propensity to do diversifying acquisitions increases in the strength of 
the country’s creditor rights.  
 
Hypothesis II: The firm’s cash flow risk, measured as the volatility of its cash-flow-to-
assets ratio, is decreasing in the strength of the country’s creditor rights. 
 
Hypothesis III: The firm’s leverage (debt-to-assets ratio) is decreasing in the strength of 
the country’s creditor rights. 
 
Hypothesis IV:  In countries with strong creditor rights, target firms in high-recovery 
industries are more likely to be acquired by firms in low-recovery industry. 
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 The first hypothesis is tested primarily for diversification across industries, but we 
also test it for cross-border acquisitions, which are a form of diversification.    The second 
hypothesis tests a broader implication of creditor rights for corporate risk taking, 
examining whether companies’ cash flow risk is decreasing in creditor rights.  And the 
third hypothesis complements these tests by looking at financial leverage of firms in 
countries as a function of creditor rights.   
The fourth hypothesis examines the effect of creditor rights on the choice of 
assets by acquirers. A firm with high-recovery assets can liquidate some of them in time 
of distress and use the proceeds to defer default.  High-recovery assets lose less of their 
value in distressed sale and fetch prices that are closer to their value in best use (using the 
notion of “asset specificity” from Shleifer and Vishny (1992)).  Bidder firms with low-
recovery assets are therefore more vulnerable to default risk because they are less able to 
defer default by asset liquidation.  Indeed, Berger, Ofek and Swary (1996) find that a 
high recovery value of assets (imputed from book value items) has particularly high value 
for firms in financial distress. Also, Eckbo and Thornburn’s (2003) study suggests that it 
is in managerial interest to increase the recovery rate of debt in default (which is related 
to assets’ characteristics), because the probability of rehiring managers who are 
automatically dismissed in bankruptcy is an increasing function of the recovery rate of 
the firm’s debt.  
We test these effects of creditor rights both in the cross-section of countries and in 
time-series, around changes in creditor rights of a country. The main tests are conducted 
in a transaction- or firm-level cross-section. We also do the tests in aggregate country-
level and industry-level values for the variables that we test. 
 These four hypotheses relate creditor rights to the corporate risk taking. The 
question is whether creditor rights induce corporate managers to trade off value for lower 
risk when doing acquisitions, that is, whether managers give up value in order to gain 
lower risk in countries with stronger creditor rights. We propose the following: 
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Hypothesis V:  In countries with stronger creditor rights, diversifying acquisitions have 
lower post-merger profitability and lower value.  There is no such negative effect of 
strong creditor rights in case of focusing acquisitions. 
 
 This hypothesis is tested using two measures of performance around the time of 
acquisitions: the post-merger return on assets (ROA) compared to the ROA in the year 
before the acquisition, and the change in the acquirer’s stock price (cumulative abnormal 
return) at the announcement of the acquisition. 
The data in our analysis include country variables – legal and economic – and 
data on individual companies and acquisition transactions. Table 1 describes how the 
variables are constructed and the data sources. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
3.1. Creditor Rights 
We use the data on creditor rights from LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1998), who record creditor rights provisions in a cross-country sample as of 
1994.  The variable CRIGHTS is the sum of four provisions: AUTOSTAY, the absence of 
automatic stay on the assets of the debtor in reorganization; REORG, the requirement of 
creditors’ consent or minimum dividend for a debtor to file for reorganization; 
SECURED, ranking secured creditors first in the disposition of assets of the bankrupt 
firm upon filing for reorganization; and MANAGES, the removal of management from 
managing the activities of the firm upon filing for reorganization.  Each of these 
provisions takes a value of 1, if it is present in the country’s bankruptcy code or zero if it 
is absent.  Consequently, the range of values for CRIGHTS is 0 through 4.  In our 38-
country sample (see Table 2), the mean of CRIGHTS is 2.08 with standard deviation of 
1.28.  As a robustness check, we use the creditor rights data of Djankov et al. (2007) to 
re-estimate our models and to examine the effects of changes in creditor rights.   
 
3.2. Creditor rights and diversification in M&A activity 
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Our first set of tests is based on measuring corporate risk reduction through 
diversifying acquisitions. The data on acquisitions is obtained from the Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC)’s Platinum Mergers & Acquisitions database for the period 1994-
2004.  Our sample consists of 38 countries with data on creditor rights as of 1994 and that 
satisfy the requirements on transactions specified below.  First, we only include mergers 
where both the acquirer and the target are under the same jurisdiction as it applies to 
creditor rights.  Separately, we present evidence on the effect of creditor rights on 
geographic diversification, using cross-border transactions. We exclude acquisitions 
where the acquirer is in the financial industry (SIC header 6), which includes acquirers in 
LBOs, or a regulated industry (SIC headers 48 and 49).  We further exclude transactions 
where the acquirer and the target are the same company (repurchases recorded as 
acquisitions), transactions where the acquirer is a mutual company, investment company, 
subsidiary, or state-owned enterprise, and transactions in which the percentage acquired 
from the target is less than 20 percent.14  Finally, we begin by including only countries 
with at least 50 transactions that satisfy the above criteria, but additional data requirement 
on transaction value reduces the sample size for some countries. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE. 
 
We test Hypothesis I by estimating the likelihood of same-industry acquisition in 
a country as a function of the creditor rights in that country, controlling for other 
variables. By our hypothesis, this likelihood should be negatively related to creditor 
rights. We define a diversifying acquisition as one where the acquirer and target are not 
in the same industry (using 2-digit SIC code).15  We do the analysis at both the individual 
acquisitions level (Table 3) and at the aggregate country level, examining the proportion 
of the same-industry domestic mergers among all domestic mergers in the sample period.  
The main explanatory variable in our analysis is CRIGHTS, the aggregate 
measure of creditor rights from La Porta et al. (1998), and its components, AUTOSTAY, 
                                                 
14 Our results are robust to setting the cutoff at 10% acquired or to adopting more conservative criteria, following 
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004), of the acquisition being at least 51% of the target company, the transaction 
value is at least 1 million US$, the transaction represents at least 1% of the total assets of the acquirer, and the 
transaction is completed within three years of the announcement of the deal.  
15 The results are qualitatively similar when we employ industry classification at the 3-digit SIC level. 
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REORG, SECURED and MANAGES.  We predict that the coefficient of CRIGHTS is 
negative, that is, there is lower likelihood of same-industry mergers in countries with 
stronger creditor rights.  
The control variables include shareholder rights index, SHRIGHTS (obtained from 
LaPorta et al. (1998)). If diversifying (focusing) mergers are in shareholder interest, after 
controlling for creditor rights, this variable should have a negative (positive) coefficient.  
We also include variables that proxy for the development and efficiency of the capital 
market (see La Porta et al., 1997): Log(Market Cap), the value of securities on the 
national stock markets in 1994 in U.S. dollars, in logarithm,16 Accounting Disclosure, 
measured by the extent to which the firm’s financial statement includes 90 items (as of 
1994), and Rule of Law,  an index that captures better enforcement of legal rights in a 
country (from La Porta et al. (1998).) The effect of these variables should be positive if 
the internal capital markets in conglomerates substitute for less-efficient outside capital 
markets.  Similarly, Emerging Market dummy variable (= 1 if the country has GDP-per-
capita below the sample median) should have a negative coefficient if internal capital 
markets in conglomerates are valuable.  Flexibility to Fire (an index of rules and 
regulations reflecting the ease of firing workers) proxies for the efficiency of the labor 
market, which may affect the type of mergers. Legal Origin influences a number of 
institutional variables in a country including creditor- and shareholder rights (La Porta et 
al., 1998) and also interacts with the likelihood of bankruptcies (Claessens and Klapper, 
2005). The sources for these three legal control variables are Levine and Demirguc-Kunt 
(2001) and La Porta et al. (1998).   
Additional controls are the country’s macroeconomic volatility, MacroRisk, 
measured by the standard deviation of quarterly changes in the country’s index of 
industrial production.  It has negative coefficient if managers in riskier countries do more 
diversifying mergers. We also include the country’s average real GDP per-capita over 
1994-2000 (in logarithm) from the Penn World Table Version 6.1 as a proxy for the 
degree of economic development, because developed and developing countries may have 
                                                 
16 Our results are robust to an alternative definition of capital market development, using the ratio of the market 
capitalization to the GDP as of 1994. However, this definition of capital market development ranks Malaysia, Hong 
Kong and South Africa at the top while the U.S. ranks in eighth place, after Chile; and, equally strangely,  Japan is 
ranked thirteenth, after Thailand and the Philippines. 
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different investment opportunity sets. The model also includes Transaction Value (the 
amount paid in U.S. dollars, in logarithm) and firms’ leverage.  
We include the leverage of both the acquirer and the target firms because in 
acquiring the equity of the target firm the acquirer should take into account the target’s 
financial risk.  Leverage represents financial distress risk which induces diversifying 
mergers, and therefore we expect the coefficients of leverage to be negative.  In 
estimation, we face a data limitation. Over 45% of the acquirers in our sample and 88% 
of the target firms do not have accounting information. Consequently, leverage data on 
both acquirer and target are available for only 2,586 transactions, about 8% of the sample 
(without the U.S. and the U.K, we have only 746 transactions with leverage data.)  In 
addition, a firm’s leverage in any country is partly endogenous to the country’s creditor 
rights. We therefore use estimated leverage variables, derived from an instrumental 
variables regression.  For all transactions with data on leverage (defined as total liabilities 
net of equity and deferred taxes, divided by total assets) for both acquirer and target, we 
estimate a regression of acquiring firm’s leverage on all country-level control variables 
and on two exogenous variables, the ranks (in quartiles) of the U.S. median leverage and 
the U.S. median tangibility (the ratio of fixed assets to total assets) for the industry of 
acquiring firm over the years 1992-2004. The U.S. has low level of creditor rights 
(CRIGHTS = 1) which implies under our hypotheses a less-constrained choice of 
leverage, and it has the most data on all industries, making the estimation more reliable. 
Thus, the leverage of an acquirer firm in any industry in any country is imputed based on 
the estimated leverage in that country and industry, obtained from a model of the 
acquirer’s leverage as a function of two exogenous industry variables, using U.S. data, 
and of the acquirer’s own country’s exogenous control variables.  Target firms’ leverage 
is imputed in a similar way. We estimate a leverage model for targets for which we have 
data, and then use this model to impute the leverage of any target in a country and 
industry. 
We estimate a probit model where the dependent variable pertains to transaction j 
in country c, 
 
Pr(same industry merger)j,c =  α*CRIGHTSc+ control variables.          (7) 
19 
 
 The dependent variable equals 1 if acquirer and target are in the same 2-digit industry. 
Our hypothesis implies that α < 0. The model includes year dummy variables and the 
estimation clusters standard errors by country. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE. 
 
The results in Table 3 support our hypothesis. The coefficient of CRIGHTS is negative 
and statistically significant (column 1), meaning that stronger creditor rights are 
associated with greater propensity to diversify (lower probability of same-industry 
merger).  The results remain the same when we exclude the U.S. (column 6) or both the 
U.S. and the U.K. (column 7), that have by far the largest number of acquisitions.  The 
creditor rights component with the most negative effect is MANAGES, underscoring the 
importance of managerial dismissal in bankruptcy as an inducement to diversify.  Based 
on Columns (1), (6) and (7) of Table 3, the marginal effect of CRIGHTS on the 
propensity to acquire same-industry target, evaluated at mean CRIGHTS (“local 
elasticity”), is –9.49%,  and it is –16.48% when excluding the U.S. and the U.K.  
Notably, shareholder rights have quite the opposite effect than that of creditor 
rights. The variable SHRIGHTS has a positive effect which is significant when the U.S. is 
excluded, suggesting that shareholders’ interests induce focusing acquisitions, after 
controlling for the effect of creditor rights. As to the importance of internal capital 
markets in conglomerates, we obtain mixed results. The coefficient of Log(Market Cap) 
is positive, meaning that in countries with developed capital markets, there is a greater 
likelihood of focusing acquisitions and conglomerate mergers are hence less needed. 
However, this coefficient becomes negative and insignificant when excluding the U.S. 
and the U.K. Other results are inconsistent with the importance of internal capital markets 
in conglomerates: The positive coefficient of Emerging Market (the poorer countries) and 
the negative coefficient of GDP per capita mean that diversification is more likely in 
richer countries, where capital markets are more developed,   Also, Accounting 
Disclosure, an aspect of developed capital market, has negative effect which implies 
more conglomerate mergers in countries with developed capital markets. However, the 
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positive coefficient of Rule of Law, which may be associated with capital market 
development, is consistent with the importance of internal capital markets in countries 
with inefficient outside markets.  The variable Flexibility to Fire has insignificant effect 
when excluding the U.S. and the U.K.  The effect of the country’s MacroRisk is 
inconclusive, switching signs and changing significance depending on whether the U.S. 
and the U.K. are included or not. Target’s Leverage has a significant negative effect on 
the propensity to do same-industry mergers, suggesting that high financial distress risk 
induces diversifying acquisitions.   
The elasticity of the target leverage (evaluated at the mean of this variable) is 
-2.96, meaning that a 1% increase in the target leverage ratio reduces the likelihood of 
same-industry merger by about 3%. Reinforcing this effect, Acquirer’s leverage too has 
negative and marginally significant coefficient when excluding the U.S. and the U.K.17  
The coefficients of French and German Legal Origin are both negative and significant, 
but this is driven by the U.S. data. When the U.S. is excluded, the coefficients turn 
positive.   
A concern in our analysis is the endogeneity of creditor rights. For example, it 
could be that a country’s culture affects both its choice of creditor rights and its corporate 
behavior. We do two tests to examine the culture effect. Stulz and Williamson (2003) 
observe that creditor rights are affected by whether a country’s dominant religion is 
protestant or catholic, and Licht et al. (2005) report that creditor rights are significantly 
correlated with a country’s Uncertainty Avoidance index, estimated by Geert Hofstede in 
the 1970s in a survey of IBM employees, and defined to be “the extent to which members 
of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations” (Hofstede 2001, p. 161).  
  In our first test, we add to the model of Table 3 religion dummy variables that 
reflect the religious composition of the country’s population. We obtain that their effect is 
insignificant while the effect of creditor rights remains unchanged. We then re-estimate 
the model, adding the country’s Uncertainty Avoidance index described above.  In our 
sample, the correlation between creditor rights and Uncertainty Avoidance is -0.43, and is 
                                                 
17 The fact that both target’s and acquirer’s leverage induce diversifying acquisitions is consistent with our focus on the 
managerial agency problem, and potentially inconsistent with the view of the importance of agency problems between 
creditors and shareholders. The latter would imply that higher acquirer leverage leads to risk-taking incentives, and 
thereby, induce focusing acquisitions. 
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statistically significant. In estimating the model, we obtain that the coefficient of 
Uncertainty Avoidance is negative but insignificant: it is -0.006 (t = 1.34) for all countries 
and -0.002 (t = 0.51) when excluding the U.S. and the U.K.  This means that the 
country’s uncertainty avoidance induces acquirers to diversify, similar to the effect of 
creditor rights. Still, the effect of creditor rights remains negative and highly significant 
as before. The coefficient of CRIGHTS  is -0.273 (t = 7.11) for all countries, and it is -
0.427 (t = 3.72) without the U.S. and the U.K.  We hence conclude that the effect of 
creditor rights on the propensity to diversify is distinct from the cultural effect of 
uncertainty avoidance. 
In our second test we compare the propensity to do same-industry acquisitions in 
the U.S. and the U.K. alone. These countries have great similarity in their legal systems, 
financial development and business culture, yet they are quite different in their creditor 
rights: CRIGHTS = 1 for the U.S. while for the U.K., CRIGHTS = 4.  In particular, the 
manager in the U.K. is dismissed in bankruptcy and the firm is run by a court-appointed 
trustee, while in the U.S. debtor remains in possession. This gives debtors in the U.K. 
stronger incentive to avoid default. We then estimate model (7) only for the observations 
from the U.S. and the U.K.  The regression includes a dummy variable that equals 1 for 
acquisitions in the U.K. and 0 for the U.S., and we include as control variables firm-
specific and acquisition-specific variables, as well as year dummy variables. The 
estimated coefficient of the U.K. dummy variable is negative and significant: it is -0.503 
with t = 9.94 (the standard error is clustered by country). We conclude that even in these 
two culturally-similar countries, creditor rights have a significant negative effect on the 
propensity to do same-industry acquisitions.  
We do five robustness checks, for which we report the main findings.  In the first, 
we control for the effect of antitrust laws on the propensity to do same-industry mergers 
by adding the country’s index of the competition law as it pertains to mergers from 
Hylton and Deng (2007).18  It summarizes four items with different point score for each, 
                                                 
18 Hylton and Deng (2007, p. 21) define this variable as follows: "The Merger Score attempts to measure the size of the 
competition law net applied to mergers. It is the sum of the scores for two parts of each country's merger law; the part 
governing merger notification requirements, and the part governing the assessment of mergers. It excludes points 
assigned to defenses, such as efficiency or public-interest defenses. The countries with mandatory-premerger 
notification requirements tend to have the highest merger scores." It is available for the end of our sample period (for 
2004). Hylton and Deng’s list includes 35 countries that overlap with ours, to which we add data on Hong Kong and 
Singapore (the latter has data for 2006). We miss data for Malaysia.  
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and its value ranges from 0 to 7, where a higher score means a more stringent law. The 
mean score of this index is 5.3 and the median is 6.0. We find that this variable is not 
statistically significant. Still, the coefficient of CRIGHTS is negative and significant (t = 
6.36 for all countries, t = 3.66 when excluding the U.S. and the U.K.)    In the second 
robustness check, we admit to the sample only acquisitions of at least 90% of the target.  
Then, the coefficient of CRIGHTS is –0.141 with t = 5.11 (29,002 observations), and 
when excluding the U.S. and the U.K., the coefficient of CRIGHTS is –0.251 with t = 
3.73 (12,415 observations).  In the third test, we control for the form of financing by 
adding a dummy variable that equals 1 for cash-only transactions.  This variable is 
naturally endogenous. Its effect is insignificant in all regressions, while the coefficient of 
CRIGHTS remains negative and highly significant.  In the fourth robustness check, we re-
estimate model (7) using the data from Djankov et al. (2007) on creditor rights, which 
slightly differ from that in La Porta et al. (1988) and include changes in creditor rights for 
five countries in our sample of 38.  In this regression, the level of CRIGHTS in any year 
is the level for that entire year. In cases of a mid-year change, we use the level of creditor 
rights that existed in the year before the change. The estimation results are qualitatively 
similar to those reported in Table 3. The coefficient of CRIGHTS is -0.155 (t = 4.88) for 
the entire sample, and -0.183 (t = 2.50) when excluding the U.S. and the U.K.  As in 
Table 3, the strongest effect comes from the component MANAGES whose coefficient is -
0.600 with t = 5.18. In the fifth and last robustness check, we replace the Rule of Law 
index by Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard’s (2003) Legality index, the first principal 
component of three proxies of legality developed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-
Lobatón (1999): Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption. Its 
correlation with the Rule of Law variable that we use is 0.972.  Including Legality in the 
estimation model in lieu of Rule of Law, its coefficient is 0.232 (t = 6.65) while the 
coefficient of CRIGHT  is -0.258 (t = 6.59), quite similar in magnitude and significance 
to that reported in Table 3. Without the U.S. and the U.K., the coefficient is -0.424 (t = 
3.67).  We then add to this regression an interaction term, CRIGHTS*Legality (Legality is 
demeaned) and obtain that its coefficient is insignificant (-0.005 with t = 0.15), while the 
coefficient of CRIGHTS remains practically the same in magnitude and significance. 
When excluding the U.S. and the U.K., the coefficient of the interaction term is negative 
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and significant, -0.122 (t = 2.64) while the coefficient of CRIGHTS remains similar to 
that before, both in magnitude and levels of significance.  
 
Country-level estimation of cross-industry acquisitions. Reverting to the 
analysis of within-country mergers, we test our hypothesis at the aggregate country level, 
where each country is one observation.  The advantage here is that large and small 
countries are treated alike. The shortcoming is that, as Holderness (2009) points out, it 
may be inappropriate to infer individual firm behavior from aggregate data because firm-
level and transaction-level variables are omitted, which can cause bias if these variables 
are correlated with country-level variables. With this caveat in mind, we find that the 
country-level results on the effects of creditor rights are consistent with those obtained 
from the preceding individual-transaction regressions, thus supporting our conclusions. 
We calculate for each country c the measure SAMEc = [(# of mergers in the same 
2-digit SIC code industry) / (# of all domestic mergers)].  Figure 2 plots the variable 
SAME for different countries as a function of their CRIGHTS, showing the negative 
relationship between the extent of same-industry mergers and strength of creditor rights. 
We then estimate the following model by the tobit method, with 38 observations 
(countries): 
 
SAMEc = β0 + β1*CRIGHTSc + country-level control variables.          (8) 
 
For sake of parsimony, we present only the coefficients of the creditor rights variable and 
its components:  
CRIGHTS –0.030 (t = 3.28).   
AUTOSTAY –0.056 (t = 2.48). 
REORG –0.017 (t = 0.74). 
SECURED –0.022 (t = 1.25). 
MANAGES –0.100 (t = 4.41). 
The results again support our hypothesis.  The coefficient of creditor right 
(CRIGHTS) is negative and significant and, as in Table 3, the most important component 
is MANAGES, the indicator of managerial dismissal in bankruptcy.    In contrast to the 
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negative coefficient of CRIGHTS, the coefficient of shareholder rights is positive and 
significant suggesting that focusing mergers are in shareholder interest, after controlling 
for creditor rights. As a robustness test, we re-estimate the regression using creditor rights 
index that reflects the different level of creditor rights for some countries in some years 
(due to changes over time), using data from Djankov et al. (2007).   CRIGHTS here is the 
average of the CRIGHTS index of the country over the sample period, weighted by the 
number of transactions in the years following the year of change relative to the total 
number of transactions in the country (assuming that the effect of a change is reflected in 
transactions in subsequent years).  The coefficient of this creditor rights variable is -0.020 
(t = 2.18), again consistent with our hypothesis. Finally, we add to the model the 
Hoftede’s culture-based variable, Uncertainty Avoidance. Its coefficient is -0.001 with t 
= 0.81, insignificant, while the coefficient of CRIGHTS remains negative and significant: 
-0.031 (t = 3.71).  
 
In a further robustness check we add as explanatory variable the merger-related 
antitrust index of Hylton and Deng (2007). Its coefficient is statistically insignificant, 
while the coefficient of CRIGHTS remains negative and significant. Further, we split the 
sample period into two, 1994-1999 and 2000-2004, calculate SAMEc for each subperiod 
and estimate the relationship between SAMEc and CRIGHTSc across countries for both 
subperiods. We exclude a sub-period for a given country if it has less than 30 transactions 
in that sub-period. The results again support our hypothesis: the coefficient of CRIGHTS 
is negative and significant: -0.025 (t = 2.05).   
 
Cross-border acquisitions:  So far we have analyzed industrial diversification in 
domestic acquisitions.  We now analyze geographic diversification by studying cross-
border acquisitions. In this regression, the dependent variable takes value of 1 if both 
bidder and target are in the same country (analogous to the earlier analysis where bidder 
and target are in the same industry), and a value of 0 for cross-border acquisition.  We 
use the creditor rights in the country of the acquirer, which is assumed to make the 
acquisition decision and whose interests dictate its nature.19  The analysis includes 
                                                 
19 The target may in fact be outside of the sample of countries for which we have data on creditor rights. 
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acquirers from the 38 countries in our sample, while the target firms can be from any 
country.  The estimation is similar to that of Table 3.  We have 52,975 acquisitions which 
satisfy our criteria and 20,638 acquisitions when excluding acquirers from the U.S. and 
the U.K.  
The estimation results support our hypothesis on the negative effect of creditor 
rights on same-country acquisitions.  To economize in space, we present only the 
coefficients of the creditor rights variable and its components.  
CRIGHTS –0.111 (t = 5.23).  [Excl. the U.S. and the U.K.: –0.064 (t = 2.95).] 
AUTOSTAY –0.235 (t = 4.25). 
REORG –0.331 (t = 7.01). 
SECURED –0.018 (t = 0.23). 
MANAGES –0.201 (t = 2.66). 
Again, the coefficient of shareholder rights (SRIGHTS) has the opposite sign – it is 
positive – and it is significant (t = 2.71) when we exclude the U.S. and the U.K. 
  
Diversification across industry lines of business. Firms can also diversify by 
developing their own lines of business in different industries. We now study the 
relationship between creditor rights and the number of segments, or industry lines of 
business, that firms have.  Segment data are available in the Compustat North America 
Segment file, which confines the sample to firms that file such reports by the U.S. rules.20 
These include non-U.S. firms whose stock is traded in the U.S. through ADRs (American 
Depository Receipts) or that are listed in the U.S. or report by U.S. rules to abide by the 
securities laws, as well as Canadian firms.  Surely, this sample is limited to selected firms 
from foreign countries whose characteristics (like size, visibility or type of business) 
make their securities trade in the U.S., or to non-U.S. firms that choose to be covered by 
the U.S. financial reporting rules.  With this caveat in mind, we analyze the data on the 
effect of creditor rights on the firms’ tendency to diversify across lines of business.   
The sample consists of 836 firms from 21 countries in the manufacturing 
industries (SIC codes 1000 through 3999), excluding the U.S., with 4,520 firm-years of 
                                                 
20 Foreign firms listing in the U.S. are required to file with the SEC and reconcile with the U.S. GAAP and FASB rules 
(in particular, SFAS 131 and its predecessor, SFAS 14, regarding the reporting of segments data) in their annual 
reports. 
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reporting between 1992 and 2005.  We also require that firms have leverage data in either 
the Compustat North America or the Compustat Global Vantage databases, and as before 
we require at least six firms with data in a country.  Because Canadian firms constitute 
about half of the firm-years in our sample, we repeat our estimation for a sample of 20 
countries with 2,132 firm years that excludes Canadian firms. 
We estimate two models:  
(i) Probit regression, where the dependent variable equals 1 if the firm has more 
than one business segment and 0 otherwise, and  
(ii) OLS estimation, where the dependent variable is log(number of segments).  
The regression model includes the explanatory variables that appear in Table 3, with the 
firm leverage being estimated and instrumented with the same variables.  
We hypothesize that coefficient of CRIGHTS is positive, i.e., creditor rights 
induce firms to diversify across lines of business (internally or by acquisitions). This is 
indeed what we find. The coefficients of CRIGHTS are as follows: 21 
Probit estimation: 0.346 (t = 2.94). Excluding Canada: 0.236 (t = 3.45). 
OLS estimation: 0.110 (t = 3.72).  Excluding Canada: 0.106 (t = 2.51). 
These results further support our main hypothesis that stronger creditor rights 
induce firms to reduce their risk through diversification. 
 
3.3. Value effects of creditor rights in diversifying acquisitions 
  
 
There is a debate on the effect of diversification on corporate value, with the 
preponderance of evidence suggesting that it is value-reducing (see our review in the 
introduction). Here, we examine the effect of diversification on corporate performance 
only to the extent of its interaction with creditor rights. We hypothesize that diversifying 
acquisitions lead to lower performance in countries with stronger creditor rights. While 
some diversifying acquisitions are undertaken for economic reasons (to improve the 
acquirer’s performance), others are motivated by the manager’s desire to avoid the threat 
                                                 
21 The complete regression results are available from the authors upon request. The standard errors are clustered by 
country, and we add year dummy variables. 
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posed by strong creditor rights. Managers then face a tradeoff and may sacrifice corporate 
performance to reduce  their personal costs in default. This incentive to undertake 
diversifying acquisitions even if they hurt performance increases as creditor rights are 
stronger.  In testing this hypothesis we present  as benchmark the  performance-creditor 
rights relationship in focusing (i.e., same-industry) acquisitions, which are more likely to 
be done for economic reasons (such as synergy) and therefore we do not expect creditor 
rights to have negative effect. 
First, we examine the acquiring firms’ return on assets (ROA) in the three years 
after the acquisition compared to the ROA in the year before the acquisition.  Second, we 
examine the acquirer’s stock price change, measured as the cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) over a seven-day window surrounding the acquisition announcement.  We 
estimate the following model separately for focusing and for diversifying acquisitions: 
 
Performancej,c =  a1*CRIGHTSc + control variables.          (9) 
 
In the first test, Performancej,c is measured by dROA(k)j,c = ROAj,c(t+k) – ROAj,c(t-1), the 
change in the return on assets of acquirer firm j in country c, k year(s) after the 
acquisition compared to one year before it. ROAj,c(t+k) = (EBITDA /ASSETS)j,c,t+k and t is 
the effective year of the acquisition.  (ROAj,c,t is winzorized, 1% in each tail.)  The data 
source is Compustat Global Vantage and all data are annual.  EBITDAj,c,t is earnings 
before interest, taxes and depreciation and amortization (the sum of data items #14 and 
#11), which is unaffected by methods of accounting depreciation that differ across 
countries, and ASSETSi,c,t is the contemporaneous total assets (data item #89).  The use 
ROA as performance measure follows Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) who suggest that 
this measure is unaffected by the method of accounting used in mergers. The control 
variables include all the country variables used in the previous analyses and 
Log(transaction Value).  We add the inverse Mill’s ratio from the probit regression 
presented in Table 3 to control for the endogeneity of the decision to diversify.  The 
model includes industry fixed effects to control for industry-wide changes in profitability.  
We estimate the model for one, two and three years after the merger (k = 1, 2, 3). 
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INSERT TABLE 4 HERE. 
 
The coefficient a1 measures the extent to which the post-merger change in the 
acquirer’s ROA is affected by the country’s creditor rights. Our hypothesis is: 
For diversifying acquisitions, a1 < 0 because managers may sacrifice corporate 
performance to attain lower risk. 
For focusing (same-industry) acquisitions, a1 ≥ 0.   
The results in Table 4, columns (1)-(6), support our hypothesis.  The coefficient 
a1 is negative and highly significant in all diversifying mergers for all three post-merger 
horizons, both for entire sample and for the sample that excludes the U.S. and the U.K.  
That is, the acquirer’s post-merger performance is significantly lower in countries with 
stronger creditor rights up to three years after the merger, compared to its performance in 
the pre-merger year.  For focusing (same-industry) acquisitions, the coefficient a1 is not 
significantly different from zero, again consistent with our hypothesis.  We conclude that 
diversifying acquisitions that seem to be motivated by stronger creditor rights are 
followed by worsening of corporate performance. 
As a robustness check, we re-estimate the model using the creditor rights variable 
from Djankov et al. (2007).  The results are again qualitatively the same.  For example, 
for dROA(1), the coefficient of CRIGHTS for diversifying acquisitions is -0.0166 (t = 
2.73) while for focusing acquisitions, the coefficient is 0.0092 (t = 1.31). 
When we exclude the U.S. and the U.K. (which have by far the largest number of 
observations), the results remain qualitatively the same. For diversifying acquisitions, the 
coefficients of CRIGHTS in model (9) for dROA(1)j,c is -0.015 (t = 3.43), for dROA(2)j,c it 
is -0.017 (t = 4.07) and  for dROA(3)j,c it is -0.013 (t = 4.17). In contrast, for same-
industry acquisitions, the coefficients of CRIGHTS are all insignificantly different from 
zero. Again, the results suggest that diversifying acquisitions hurt performance in 
countries with strong creditor rights. 
In the second test, Performancej,c is the acquirer’s CAR, the cumulative abnormal 
return over days t-3 to t+3, where day t is the announcement day.  We use this relatively 
wide time window because in some countries, (i) low stock liquidity causes a slower 
adjustment of stock prices to the information after the announcement, and (ii) lax 
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enforcement of insider trading rules may cause trading on the information a couple of 
days prior to the formal announcement. The daily abnormal return is the difference 
between the daily stock return and the market-model expected return, where the market 
model parameters are estimated from a regression of weekly stock returns on the 
country’s index. The parameter estimation uses 105 weeks of data with no less than 52 
weeks, up to 9 weeks before the week of the acquisition announcement.  The cumulative 
abnormal return is calculated over the seven days surrounding the announcement day. 
The resulting sample of firms’ CAR is then winsorized at 1% at both tails. The results on 
the effect of creditor rights on CAR support our hypothesis and are consistent with the 
results on post-acquisition changes in the acquirer’s ROA.  As presented in Table 4, 
columns (7)-(8), diversifying acquisitions lower the acquirer’s value in countries with 
stronger creditor rights: the coefficient a1 of CRIGHTS in model (9) is negative and 
significant for diversifying acquisitions (column (8)), -0.013 (t = 5.14), meaning a loss of 
1.3% in value upon the announcement of such deals for any unit of CRIGHTS, while for 
focusing (same-industry) acquisitions (column 7)  it is positive, 0.011 (t = 1.65)  The 
results are similar when we exclude the U.S. and the U.K., which have relatively very 
large number of cases.22  Then, the coefficient of CRIGHTS in diversifying acquisitions 
is -0.011 (t = 2.40), which is significant, while in focusing acquisitions it is 0.002 (t = 
0.26), insignificant. 
   
We again test the difference between the U.S. and the U.K. that have very similar 
culture, legal system and capital market, while their have very different creditor rights: 
for the U.S., CRIGHTS = 1 whereas for the U.K. CRIGHTS = 4.  We estimate a 
regression of CAR as a dependent variable in a model similar to that in Table 4, with 
these two countries only, replacing CRIGHTS by a dummy variable UK which equals 1 
for a U.K. acquirer and 0 for a U.S. acquirer, and excluding country-related variables. 
The results are: 
Diversifying acquisitions:   The coefficient of UK is –0.017, t = 34.52. 
Focusing acquisitions:   The coefficient of UK is  0.071, t = 5.89. 
                                                 
22 The results are qualitatively similar when using Djanov et al.’s (2007) on CRIGHTS. The coefficient of CRIGHTS in 
the diversifying acquisitions model is -0.007 (t = 3.36) and it is 0.004 (t = 0.53) for same-industry acquisitions. 
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These results demonstrate the value effect of diversifying acquisitions conditional 
on creditor rights.  Strong creditor rights induce managers to undertake risk-reducing 
acquisitions, even if they result in post-acquisition decline in profitability and in value 
loss, in order to reduce the threat posed by default.  
 
3.4. Creditor rights and firms’ cash flow risk 
We now test hypothesis II on the relationship between corporate cash flow risk 
and creditor rights. In addition to doing diversifying acquisitions, firms can reduce their 
risk by other means which are not directly observed.  We therefore measure directly the 
level of corporate risk and relate it to the creditor rights in the country. 
The risk of operating cash flows of firm j in country c, RISKj,c, is the standard 
deviation of the industry-adjusted  firm’s return on assets. We calculated the annual 
ROAj,c,t, described in the previous section, for the period 1992-2005, and winsorized the 
entire sample at 0.5% in both tails of the distribution to account for possible data errors 
and large outliers.  Then we subtract from ROAj,c,t the median ROA of its industry (2-digit 
SIC code) for that year, and calculate the standard deviation of the resulting industry-
adjusted series.  The entire sample of RISKj,c is again winsorized at 1% in both tails of its 
distribution to eliminate outliers.  We include only firms in the manufacturing industries 
with data for at least eight years. We exclude utilities and financial firms which are 
regulated in many countries, and this could affect their risk.   
 
 We estimate the effect of creditor rights on firms’ risk in the following model: 
 
RISKj,c = γ*CRIGHTSc + control variables.                      (10) 
 
Our hypothesis implies γ < 0. We again estimate this model at both the firm level 
(Table 5) and the country level, the latter using the median risk of the firms in the 
country. The control variables are those used in Table 3, but also adding firm size (the 
logarithm of firm’s initial total assets, as of the beginning of its data in our sample) which 
negatively correlates with risk.  
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We estimate the model of single-firm risk level as a panel regression, with 
country-clustered standard errors. This regression includes 35 countries due to 
insufficient data in three countries (we required at least 6 firms with the required series of 
accounting data in a country), giving us a total of 5,394 firms for the firm-level analysis.  
 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE. 
 
The results in Table 5 support our hypothesis: the coefficient γ of RISKj,c on 
CRIGHTSc is negative and statistically significant. Based on model (1), one standard 
deviation increase in the strength of the creditors’ rights (CRIGHTSc) leads to a decrease 
in RISKj,c of 13.1% of its mean. As in the earlier results on same-industry mergers (Table 
3), the most significant component of CRIGHTS that negatively affect RISK is 
managerial dismissal (MANAGES). The addition of that provision alone decreases RISKj,c 
by 34.1% of its mean, based on model (5). The results on the effect of CRIGHTS are 
qualitatively unchanged when excluding the U.S. and the U.K. (columns (6) and (7)).   
Among the control variables, firms with high financial risk, measured by higher 
leverage choose to have lower cash flow risk.  Leverage is instrumented because of its 
endogeneity; the instruments are, as in Table 3, the country control variables and two 
exogenous variables, the U.S. industry rank of leverage and tangibility, for the industry to 
which firm j belongs.  Large firms have lower risk, as expected. As to country variables, 
higher Macro Risk has positive effect on RISKj,c, as expected, although its significant is 
marginal when excluding the U.S. and the U.K.  The effect of capital market 
development, as measured by Log(Market Cap), is positive although it is insignificant 
when excluding the U.S. and the U.K.  The coefficient of Flexibility to fire is positive, 
but becomes negative and insignificant in the next estimation of the model in a country-
level regression. 
As a robustness test, we control for cultural differences between countries by 
adding to the model the culture-based variable Uncertainty Avoidance from Hofstede 
(2001), expecting its effect to be negative. Indeed, its coefficient is -0.0001, but t = 0.09, 
insignificant. Without the U.S. and the U.K., its coefficient is -0.0001 with t = 0.17.  The 
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effect of creditor rights on RISK is unaltered. In this regression, the coefficient of 
CRIGHTS is -0.006 (t = 2.88), and without the U.S. and the U.K. it is -0.0054 (t = 2.40). 
 Next, we do country-level tests of the RISK-CRIGHTS relationship, where each 
country is a single observation and they are all treated alike. The dependent variable, 
RISK*c, is the country average of the individual firms’ industry-adjusted risk, RISKj,c.  
The coefficients of interest, γ of CRIGHTS and its components in model (10), are: 
CRIGHTS –0.007 (t = 3.35).  
AUTOSTAY –0.015 (t = 2.12). 
REORG –0.001 (t = 0.15). 
SECURED –0.010 (t = 1.49). 
MANAGES –0.023 (t = 3.50) 
The results again support our hypothesis. The coefficient of CRIGHTS  is negative and 
significant at better than 5%, even though we have only 22 degrees of freedom. As 
before, the strongest effect is due to the managerial dismissal component (MANAGES), 
with lack of stay on secured creditors (AUTOSTAY) being also significantly negative.  Of 
the country control variables, notably Log(Market Cap) retains its negative effect, though 
its statistical significance is marginal. When adding the variable Uncertainty Avoidance 
to the model, we obtain that its coefficient is negative, -0.0003  with t = 2.02, statistically 
significant. Yet, the effect of creditor rights remains negative and significant as before. 
The coefficient of CRIGHTS is -0.0063 with t = 4.00. 
 We thus find support through an independent test for the hypothesis that in 
countries with stronger creditor rights, firms have lower cash flow risk. 
 
3.5. Industry-adjusted propensity to reduce risk  
Countries differ in their industrial composition, which may affect the propensity 
to do same-industry mergers and may affect the average firms risk in the country.  We 
therefore estimate our model at the industry level, employing the Rajan-Zingales (1998) 
methodology.  The model uses as benchmark the inherent propensity to do same-industry 
acquisitions or the inherent level of firm risk by using the relevant variable from 
industries in the U.S., which has the most data on firms and is among the least 
constrained countries in terms of creditor rights.  We estimate two models:  
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  SAMEk,c = β0 +β1*SAMEk,US + β2*CRIGHTSdmc*SAMEk,US  +Country fixed effects   (11) 
 
where SAMEk,US is the proportion in the U.S. of firms in industry k acquiring firms in the 
same industry (using 2-digit SIC code), calculated for the period 1994-1997, and SAMEk,c 
is similarly the proportion of same-industry acquisitions of acquirers in industry k in 
country c for the subsequent period, 1998-2004. CRIGHTSdmc is the de-meaned value of 
CRIGHTSc, obtained by subtracting the overall mean CRIGHTS.  We include an industry 
from a given country if it has at least six qualified transactions during the period 1998-
2004. The estimation is done by the tobit method. The second model is,   
 
RISKk,c = δ0 + δ1*RISKk,US + δ2* CRIGHTSdmc*RISKk,US  + Country fixed effects    (12) 
 
where RISKk,US is the median risk level in industry k in the U.S., calculated for the 1992-
1998,  and  RISKk,c is the median risk in the same industry in country c, calculated over 
the subsequent period 1999-2005.23   
 In both models, we expect that the coefficient of the interaction between creditor 
rights and the inherent variable to be negative. Indeed, this is what we obtain: 
For model (11): β1 = 1.310 (t = 9.83), β2 = –0.263 (t = 7.56), R2 = 25.0%. 
For model (12): δ1 = 0.862 (t = 4.49), δ2 = –0.158 (t = 2.16), R2 = 30.2%.  
The negative and significant coefficients β2 and δ2 imply that across countries 
creditor rights reduce the tendency of firms in industries to do same-industry acquisitions 
relative to the inherent such tendency in these industries, and reduce the risk of firms in 
industries relative to the inherent risk in these industries.  
 
 
3.6. Creditor rights and financial leverage 
Corporate managers can also reduce their exposure to the costs resulting from 
stronger creditor rights by reducing their financial leverage.  Lower leverage reduces the 
                                                 
23 The results are qualitatively unchanged when the variables for both the U.S. and all other countries are calculated 
over the entire sample period, 1992-2005. 
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likelihood of incurring the costs associated with bankruptcy for any given level of 
corporate activity and risk.  Thus, it is reasonable to assume that stronger creditor rights 
reduce the corporate demand for leverage.  This hypothesis is in contrast with that of La 
Porta et al. (1998) who suggest that stronger creditor rights increase the supply of funds 
by lenders whose rights are better protected in bankruptcy.   
The question is: given the conflicting effects of stronger creditor rights on demand 
and supply of leverage, what is the equilibrium level of leverage as a function of creditor 
rights?  If the perceived cost by corporate managers of stronger creditor rights outweighs 
the benefit of greater supply of credit that the stronger creditor rights generate, there 
should be a negative relationship between creditor rights and corporate leverage. This is 
the hypothesis that we test. We estimate the model 
 
Leveragej,t,c = δ*CRIGHTSc + control variables.          (13) 
 
Leveragej,t,c is the industry-adjusted debt-to-asset ratio (in book value) of firm j in year t 
in country c,  where debt is total liabilities minus equity and minus deferred taxes.  We 
calculate each firm’s annual leverage and winsorize the data at 1% in both tails of its 
distribution to eliminate outliers.  Then we subtract from it the year’s median industry 
leverage (using 2-digit SIC code) to create the industry-adjusted firm’s leverage.  The 
sample of firms is the same as in the tests of cash flow risk.  The sample includes 36,237 
firm years with leverage data, of which 17,304 are in countries excluding the U.S. and the 
U.K.  The regression includes all country variables and company-specific variables that 
appear in Table 5 (the cash flow risk estimation) and additional variables that are used in 
studies of leverage: country corporate tax rate in each year, company asset’s tangibility, 
company size (assets in U.S. dollars) and company profitability, measured by 
EBITDA/Assets. The company control variables are lagged one year relative to the 
estimated leverage variables, as are the country tax rates.24 The regression includes year 
fixed effects and standard errors are clustered by country.25 
                                                 
24 Data on the country tax rates ends in 2002, and is then applied for 2003-2005. 
25 Clustering can be done instead by firms, given that the observations are firm-years. When we do that, we obtain 
smaller standard errors than those reported, and consequently, the t-statistics are greater. For example, the t-statistic of 
the coefficient of CRIGHTS for the entire sample is 8.96, and that of CRIGHTS is the sample that excludes the U.S. and 
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 Our hypothesis is that in model (13), δ < 0, i.e., stronger creditor rights induce 
corporate managers to reduce financial risk by reducing corporate leverage.  The results 
in Table 6 support this hypothesis: the coefficient of CRIGHTS is negative and 
significant.  In the sample of all countries, the coefficient of CRIGHTS is -0.022 with t = 
5.20, and in a sample of 36 countries, after excluding the U.S. and the U.K., it is -0.018 
with t = 3.42. Based on model (1), one standard deviation increase in CRIGHTSc leads to 
an additional decrease in leverage of 19.6% below its average. All four categories of 
creditor rights have negative and significant coefficients, attesting to the consistency in 
the negative effect of creditor rights on leverage. Among these, the addition of the 
managerial dismissal provision decreases leverage by an additional 31.3% below its 
average, based on model (5).  
 We get similar results in a robustness test that employs Djankov et al.’s (2007) 
data on creditor rights. In the sample of all countries, the coefficient of CRIGHTS is 
-0.018 with t = 3.52, and after excluding the U.S. and the U.K., it is -0.013 with t = 4.59. 
A second robustness test examines the effect of Hofstede’s Uncertainty Avoidance index 
of the country, because it could be that the culture in a country affects both its law 
regarding creditor rights and the propensity of its business managers to borrow and 
assume financial risk. Adding Uncertainty Avoidance to the control variables in model 
(13) and Table 6, we obtain that its coefficient is negative, -0.0001, but it is insignificant 
(t = 0.56). Excluding the U.S. and the U.K., the coefficient is 0.0002 (t = 0.75). Yet, the 
negative and significant effect of CRIGHTS is unaltered: its coefficient is then -0.0221 (t 
= 5.54) and excluding the U.S. and the U.K., the coefficient is -0.0163 (t = 3.04). 
 We also test our hypothesis at the country level. In every year we calculate the 
average industry-adjusted leverage ratio for the country and then do a regression of the 
country’s average leverage on the creditor rights in the country as well as on all the 
country variables and on year dummy variables. The results are consistent with those 
                                                                                                                                                 
the U.K. is 4.77. In Table 8, we present clustering by country, which is more conservative and consistent with the 
clustering in the other estimations. 
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obtained in the firm-level test.  We present here for brevity the coefficients of creditor 
rights and its components: 
CRIGHTS: –0.019 (t = 9.32).   
AUTOSTAY: –0.015 (t = 3.01). 
REORG: –0.027 (t = 6.92). 
SECURED: –0. 032 (t = 6.06). 
MANAGES: –0.018 (t = 3.05). 
 
Moreover, most of the control variables preserve their signs and significance. The 
exceptions are average tangibility and average profitability that now become insignificant 
as compared to the firm-level leverage regressions. On the other hand, country-level 
variables such as accounting disclosure, rule of law and log GDP per capita become more 
significant. The question is whether the level of leverage matters from an economic 
perspective, given Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) theorem of the irrelevance of leverage 
in a frictionless world.  But if leverage (at some level) were not beneficial, its level would 
not have declined when its cost rises in the face of stronger creditor rights. The negative 
relationship between leverage and creditor rights that we estimate suggests that firms are 
willing to forego some of the benefits of leverage when faced with stronger creditor 
rights. 
 
3.7. Risk reduction and industry recovery rates 
Our final test of the effect of creditor rights on corporate behavior, which is 
different from the tests done so far, examines the choice of target in a merger or 
acquisition in terms of the recovery rate of its assets in default (henceforth recovery). The 
recovery here is the extent to which the price of the assets sold in distress is close to the 
value of the asset in its best use, following the definition of (inverse of) asset-specificity 
in Shleifer and Vishny (1992).  A firm with high-recovery assets can better deal with 
financial distress by partially liquidating such assets and using the proceeds to defer 
default. Assume that the firm would default without the asset sale and the use of the 
proceeds to service the debt. Then, the call option which is embedded in the firm’s equity 
would expire out of the money and thus become worthless. Then, extending the life of the 
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option by servicing the debt from liquidated assets makes equity more valuable.  This 
analysis assumes that the firm’s volatility does not decline appreciably. If the cash 
obtained from liquidating risky assets is kept in the firm, for example to satisfy a working 
capital covenant restriction, the firm’s volatility will decline and the net effect on the 
equity value is uncertain.  If a risk-averse manager’s objective is to reduce volatility, 
again high-recovery assets become attractive when strong creditor rights threaten the 
manager’s survival. Thus, management of an acquirer firm in a low-recovery industry, 
being more vulnerable to default risk, would seek high-recovery assets that enhance the 
firm’s chances of survival.   
We thus test whether creditor rights influence the type of target firm that a low-
recover bidder seeks. We denote the event of low-recovery acquirer (AL) buying high-
recovery target (TH) by AL∩TH, and the probability of this event occurring among all 
acquisitions of high-recovery target by Pr(AL∩TH|TH).  We estimate the determinants 
the likelihood of low-recovery firm acquiring high-recovery target by the model 
 
Pr(AL∩TH|TH)j,c =  b*CRIGHTSc+ control variables.        (14) 
 
We hypothesize that b > 0: stronger creditor rights induce acquirers in low- recovery 
industries to buy target firms in high-recovery industries.  We assign to firms the 
recovery level of the industry in which they operate, using the data in Acharya, Bharath 
and Srinivasan (2007, Table 2) which employs historical experience on defaults in the 
U.S. over the period 1982-1999.  Low recovery industries (in terms of 2-SIC code 
headers) are: transportation (37, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47), high technology and office 
equipment (35, 36, 38), consumer/service sector (52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 72, 73, 
75, 76, 78, 79), and leisure time/media (27, 48, 70).  High recovery industries are: energy 
and natural resources (10, 12, 13, 14, 24), building products/ homebuilders (8, 15, 17, 24, 
28, 29, 32, 34), and healthcare/chemicals (28, 80.)26  In the estimation model, the 
universe is all targets with high recovery, and the bidders are either low recovery 
                                                 
26 We alternatively follow Dyck and Zingales (2004), characterizing as low recovery rate industries the following ones: 
mining, manufacturing, and transportation. Our results are similar. 
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(dependent variable = 1), or high recovery (dependent variable = 0). The control variables 
used are those used in Tables 3 and 5. 
 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
 
 The results in Table 7 support our hypothesis. The coefficient of CRIGHTS is 
positive and significant for the entire sample as well as when excluding the U.S. and the 
U.K., which constitute more than half the sample (columns (6-10)). That is, stronger 
creditor rights induce greater likelihood of acquisition of high- recovery targets by low-
recovery firms. All components of creditor rights have positive coefficients, and except 
for the component that secured are paid first (SECURED) they are statistically 
significant. The relatively large coefficient of managerial dismissal component 
(MANAGES) underscores the evidence in Eckbo and Thornburn (2003) cited before. The 
MacroRisk has a positive effect on the likelihood of low-recovery firms acquiring high-
recovery firms, which is consistent with the view that such acquisitions are desired as 
means to reduce risk.  
We also estimate the model as a country-level regression, where the dependent 
variable is the proportion of all high-recovery targets in the country acquired by low-
recovery bidders (we use logistic transformation).  In this regression, each country is a 
single observation, regardless of the number of transactions in it. For sake of parsimony, 
we do not present the table.  The results are consistent with those of single-acquisition 
regressions. The coefficient of CRIGHTS is 0.288 with t = 3.37, highly significant.27 
This test provides additional evidence that creditor rights affect the choice of 
investment – here, an acquisition target – particularly by low-recovery acquirers, which 
seek to acquire high-recovery targets.   
 
 
                                                 
27 We further conduct a test in the spirit of this hypothesis, examining the proportion among all low-recovery bidders 
that seek high-recovery targets.  In this regression, the effect of CRIGHTS is not statistically significant. 
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3.8. The effects of changes in creditor rights  
Our analysis has shown a cross-country relationship between creditor rights and a 
number of variables: acquisitions type (focusing or diversifying, or merging low-recovery 
acquirer with high-recovery target), post-acquisition change in performance and 
corporate leverage.  This section tests the effect of creditor rights on these variables over 
time, exploiting seven changes in creditor rights that occurred in six countries: Indonesia, 
Israel, Japan (two changes), Sweden, Thailand and Russia,28 documented in Djankov et 
al. (2007). These changes imply a decrease in CRIGHTS by one unit, except for the 2002 
change in Japan that raised CRIGHTS by one unit. The changes were motivated by 
financial crises (Indonesia, Russia, Sweden and Thailand), the need to collect tax 
(Russia) or emulation of the U.S. in the transformation from a centrally-controlled 
economy, and in case of Israel, to explicitly promote risk-taking and entrepreneurship. 
We estimate the following regression, a variant of model (7): 
 
DepVarj,c = α*ΔCRIGHTSc + control variables.              (15) 
 
DepVar is (i) the probability of same-industry acquisitions, Pr(same industry);(ii) the 
probability of same-country acquisition, Pr(same country); (iii) the change in acquirer’s 
ROA k years after the acquisition, dROA(k) = ROA(t+k) - ROA(t-1); (iv) the cumulative 
abnormal return on the acquirer’s stock from 3 days before the acquisition announcement 
to 3 days after the announcement, CAR (t-3 to t+3); (v) corporate Leverage; and (vi) the 
probability of a low-recovery acquirer buying a high-recovery target, Pr(AL∩TH|TH)j,c.   
If creditor rights became weaker, we set ΔCRIGHTSc = 0 for the years that follow the 
year of change and set ΔCRIGHTSc = 1 for the period that precedes it (including the 
change year), when CRIGHTSc are stronger. Analogously, ΔCRIGHTSc = 1 during the 
period following the year of strengthening of creditor rights and ΔCRIGHTSc = 0 
beforehand.  As discussed, all changes in CRIGHTSc during the sample period but one 
made them weaker. For most countries in our sample (with no changes in creditor rights), 
ΔCRIGHTS = 0 for the entire sample period.  The control variables are Transaction Value 
                                                 
28 Russia is included only in this table’s regressions, not in any other estimation, because it has a unique legal origin. Its 
inclusion with a unique dummy variable for its legal origin will not change any of the results reported.  
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(in logarithm), with year fixed effects, industry fixed effect (except for (vi)) and, 
importantly, country fixed effects which account for all country-based variables, in line 
with the difference-in-differences methodology. In the Leverage equation, we add 
leverage-related firm-specific variables: Tangibility, Log(assets) and EBITDA/Assets. We 
estimate the regressions on the probability of focusing acquisitions by the probit method 
and the other models by OLS, with standard errors clustered at the country level to 
account for potential within-country correlation in the residuals. 
 
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE. 
 
By our hypotheses on the effect of creditor rights, we expect that in model (15) 
α < 0 for the first five dependent variables, and we expect α > 0 for Pr(AL∩TH|TH)j,c.  
The regression results in Table 8 support our hypothesis.   
(i)  DepVar = Pr(same industry). The coefficient of ΔCRIGHTSc is negative and 
statistically significant: α = –0.145 (t = 6.19).  This means that weakening of creditor 
rights significantly increases the likelihood of same-industry mergers and reduces the 
extent of diversifying, risk-reducing mergers. The marginal effect from this regression is 
-0.057, i.e., an increase in the strength of the creditor rights by one provision is associated 
with a statistically significant drop in the probability of a same industry merger by 5.7%. 
(ii)  DepVar = Pr(same country): α = –0.213 (t = 2.83). Weakening of creditor rights 
reduces the likelihood of cross-country mergers.  
(iii) DepVar = dROA(1), dROA(2) and dROA(3): The coefficients of ΔCRIGHTSc are, 
respectively, α = -0.042 (t = 5.78), α = -0.051 (t = 9.22) and α = -0.023 (t = 4.98).  All 
coefficients are negative, as expected, and significant. The negative and significant 
coefficient for dROA(1), for example, means that in countries where creditor rights were 
weakened, acquirers were induced to make more profitable acquisitions than they used to 
before the weakening of creditor rights and the improvement in their ROA was 0.042.  
Notably, in this regression we include all acquisitions, not only the diversifying ones, 
because of the self-selection in diversification. When including only diversifying 
mergers, the three coefficients of ΔCRIGHTSc are slightly more negative: -0.062 (t = 
6.87), -0.069 (t = 9.24) and α = -0.027 (t = 4.30).   
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(iv) DepVar = CAR(t-3 to t+3): The negative and significant coefficient of ΔCRIGHTSc, 
α = –0.005 (t = 3.31),  means after creditor rights were weakened, acquisitions 
contributed more value-enhancing, the improvement being 0.5% of the acquirer’s value.  
When estimating the model with diversifying acquisitions only (which is subject to 
selection), the coefficient of ΔCRIGHTSc is again slightly more negative, -0.008 (t = 
3.08).   
(v)  DepVar = Leverage: α = –0.061 (t = 2.05). Weakening of creditor rights makes firms 
increase their leverage. 
(vi) DepVar = (AL∩TH|TH) (the likelihood of a high-recovery target being acquired by a 
low-recovery firm): α = 0.147 (t = 1.08).  Strengthening creditor rights increases the 
propensity of firms with low-recovery assets to seek and buy target firms with high-
recovery assets. In this case, the coefficient is not statistically significant. 
The results on the effects of changes in creditor rights are consistent with those 
obtained in the cross-section analysis and thus support our hypotheses on the effects of 
creditor rights. 
 
4. Conclusion and Discussion  
 
We find that stronger creditor rights in a country induce firms to reduce risk. This 
is achieved by doing diversifying acquisitions, which result in loss of value and operating 
performance, and by undertaking lower cash flow and financial risk.  Thus, creditor rights 
have real effect on corporate decisions and firm value.  
Stronger creditor rights are means to mitigate stockholders’ expropriation or risk-
shifting tendencies that benefit them at the expense of bondholders (and that may be 
costly to the firm), and thereby they facilitate raising external capital.  Our findings could 
thus be construed as confirming that creditor rights do what they are expected to do: 
inhibit excessive risk taking by companies. However, stronger creditor rights induce 
managers to reduce risk and stifle even non-opportunistic risk taking that is beneficial to 
all claimholders.  Thus, strong creditor rights have a “dark side” to them by reducing 
managerial incentives to undertake value-enhancing but risky projects.  The question is 
how to strike a balance between these two effects of creditor rights, the first ex post and 
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the latter ex ante. In this paper, we highlight the ex-ante aspect, namely the inhibiting 
effect of creditor rights on risk taking by companies: corporate investments in countries 
with stronger creditor rights are more risk reducing, as reflected in diversifying 
acquisition and in lower volatility of operating cash flows. We also show that stronger 
creditor rights have negative effects on corporate profitability (return on assets) and 
company value in the case of diversifying acquisitions. 
It is argued that lenient bankruptcy laws may inhibit the supply of lending and 
make it harder to raise capital.  However, creditor rights that are too strong inhibits firms’ 
demand for borrowing and on balance, corporate leverage is lower in countries with 
stronger creditor rights.  
This tradeoff suggests that stronger creditor rights are not always optimal. The 
optimal level of creditor rights should balance their positive effect on the supply of debt 
against their negative effect on corporate risk taking and operating performance, as well 
as on the demand for debt.  In future work, it would be interesting to assess directly this 
important tradeoff.  
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Table 1. Variable Definitions 
Main Variables Source 
Risk-reduction 
measures 
  
PROP Logistic transformation of the share of same industry mergers, per country. We define it as follows: PROP = ln [SAME/(1-SAME)]. 
SAME is the proportion of same 2-digit SIC code industry mergers and acquisitions. 
SDC Platinum Mergers & 
Acquisitions. 
Firm risk (RISK)  RISKj,c is the standard deviation of firm j in country c of ROAj,c,t , where ROAj,c,t = EBITDAj,c,t / ASSETSj,c,t . t is the year, and we 
require at least 8 years of data. Data are for the period 1992-2005. The entire data of ROAi,c,t is winsorized at 0.5% in both tails to 
account for extreme observations.  The entire firm sample of RISKi,c is then winsorized at 1% in both sides of the sample distribution. 
The measure is similar to the one used in John et al. (2008). 
 
Compustat Global Industrial/ 
Commercial Annual Database. 
 
Country risk (RISK* )  
 
 
The average of RISKj,c across firms in country c.  
 
Creditor- Rights Variables 
Creditor rights (CRIGHTS) An index aggregating creditor rights, following La Porta et al. (1998).  It is the sum of the four indexes that follow. CRIGHTS then 
ranges between 0 and 4. 
La Porta et al. (1998), Djankov, 
McLeish, and Shleifer (2007) 
No automatic stay (AUTOSTAY) Equals one if the reorganization procedure does not impose an automatic stay on the assets of the firm upon filing the reorganization 
petition, creditors are able to seize their collateral after the reorganization petition is approved. It equals zero if such restriction does 
exist in the law. 
 
La Porta et al. 
(1998) 
Reorganization (REORG) Equals one if the reorganization procedure imposes restrictions, such as creditors’ consent or minimum dividend for a debtor to be 
able to file for reorganization. It equals zero for countries without such restriction. 
 
La Porta et al. 
(1998) 
Secured debt first (SECURED) Equals one if secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets of a 
bankrupt firm, as opposed to other creditors such as employees or government. Equals zero if non-secured creditors, such as the 
government and workers, are given absolute priority. 
 
La Porta et al. 
(1998) 
No management stay (MANAGES) Equals one if an official is appointed by the court, or by the creditors, is responsible for the operation of the business during 
reorganization, that is management does not retain administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization. 
Equivalently, this variable equals one if the debtor does not keep the administration of its property pending the resolution of the 
reorganization process, and zero otherwise. 
 
La Porta et al. 
(1998) 
Control Variables   
Log(GDP-per-capita) Natural logarithm of the average real GDP per capita in US dollars, 1994-2000. Penn World Tables, Version 6.1 
Macroeconomic Risk (MacroRisk) The standard deviation of the quarterly growth in real industrial production for each country in the period 1990-2004. For some 
countries, we use instead the index of manufacturing production: Argentina, Chile, Greece, Hong Kong, Indonesia, New Zealand, 
Peru, Philippines, Singapore and South Africa. For Argentina, Canada, Taiwan and Thailand, data are from the international database 
of Global Insight. The variable is measured in decimal points.  
International Financial Statistics 
of IMF.  
Rule of Law (LAW) The assessment of the law and order tradition of the country.  Calculated as “average of the months of April and October of the 
monthly index between 1982 and 1995. Scale from zero to 10, with lower scores for less tradition for law and order.” 
International Country Risk 
Guide; La Porta et al. (1998). 
Legal Origins A dummy variable that identifies the legal origin of the Company law or Commercial Code of each country. The detailed origins are 
French, German, Nordic (default is Common) 
La Porta et al. (1998) and the 
CIA Factbook 2003. 
Shareholder rights (SHRIGHTS) An index that aggregates shareholder rights. “The index is formed by adding one when: (1) the country allows shareholders to mail 
their proxy vote to the firm, (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the general shareholders’ meeting, (3) 
cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities in the board of directors is allowed, (4) an oppressed minorities 
mechanism is in place, (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary 
shareholders’ meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent (the sample median), or (6) shareholders have preemptive rights that can be 
waived only by a shareholders’ vote. The index ranges from zero to six.” 
Quotation is from La Porta et al. 
(1998). 
Accounting Disclosure An index created by the examination of the annual report in 1994 of companies across countries on their inclusion or omission of 90 
line items.  
International Accounting and 
Auditing Trends, Center for 
International Financial Analysis 
and Research 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Emerging Markets Dummy variable equal to one if the country’s GDP-per-capita (in US$, average over 1994-2000) is less than the median for the 
sample of countries. 
Penn World Tables, Version 6.1 
Flexibility to Fire An index of the ease to fire workers based on a study of the employment laws. (divided by 100.) Doing Business Report, 2004, The
World Bank 
Country corporate tax The annual top corporate tax rate for 1992-2002, per country. World Tax Database at the 
University of Michigan.  
Log(Market Cap) The logarithm of the stock market capitalization in U.S. dollars in 1994.  World Market Indicators database,
The World Bank 
ROA EBITDA/Assets Compustat Global Vantage and  
Leverage Ratio of total debt to total assets in book value.  Debt is total liabilities minus equity and minus deferred taxes. Leverage data are 
winsorized in the entire population at 1% in each tail. 
Compustat Global Vantage 
Transaction Value The amount paid in U.S. dollars. SDC Platinum Mergers & 
Acquisitions. 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (-3 
to+3) 
Cumulative abnormal return computed over the seven day window surrounding the event date. The estimation of equity betas uses 
105 weeks but requires not less than 52 weeks of data, up to 9 weeks before the week of the acquisition announcement. We use as 
market indices the corresponding countries’ main stock exchange indices. The resulting sample of firms’ CAR is then winsorized at 
1% at both tails. 
Datastream 
Tangibility Net fixed (tangible) assets / Total Assets Compustat Global Vantage 
 
Table 2. Overall descriptive statistics 
Table 2 describes the total number of domestic mergers in the sample countries for 1994-2004 that enter Table 3 regressions. The sample 
presented consists of the countries for which we have La Porta et al. (1998) data on creditor rights. We exclude countries that have less than 50 
qualified transactions in the sample period. A transaction is qualified if the percentage of acquired shares is at least 20%. We exclude financial 
industry (SIC header 6) and regulated industry companies (SIC headers 48 and 49) from the country transaction count. The mergers and 
acquisition data is from SDC Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions database. The year of creditor rights change is the one from the Djankov et 
al. (2007) study. We also present data on the average country cash flow risk proxy, RISK*. 
Acquirer’s 
Country 
Year of creditor 
rights change # Mergers  
# Same 
Industry 
Mergers  
Cash flow 
Risk Proxy 
Shareholder 
Rights 
Creditor 
Rights 
Macroeconom
ic Volatility $ GDP per capita 
  
LAW 
CHANGE COUNT SAME RISK SHRIGHTS CRIGHTS MacroRisk GDP 
Argentina  - 66 55.33% 0.058 4 1 0.07 $7,801  
Australia  - 1,618 61.72% 0.121 4 1 0.04 $20,948  
Austria  - 14 64.52% 0.036 2 3 0.09 $26,220  
Belgium  - 49 57.54% 0.043 0 2 0.08 $24,649  
Brazil  - 143 70.26% 0.07 3 1 0.03 $4,143  
Canada  - 2,071 61.37% 0.094 5 1 0.01 $20,647  
Chile  - 41 61.84% 0.033 5 2 0.04 $4,604  
Denmark  - 80 56.47% 0.049 2 3 0.07 $32,434  
Finland  - 154 54.60% 0.054 3 1 0.08 $23,856  
France  - 434 59.79% 0.045 3 0 0.1 $24,033  
Germany  - 201 55.31% 0.057 1 3 0.04 $26,443  
Greece  - 70 47.22% 0.043 2 1 0.06 $11,219  
Hong Kong  - 190 34.11% 0.064 5 4 0.13 $23,850  
India  - 236 57.87% 0.051 5 4 0.07 $423  
Indonesia  1998 39 60.53% . 2 4 0.07 $868  
Ireland  - 92 63.59% . 4 1 0.08 $21,376  
Israel  1995 73 45.45% 0.075 3 4 0.02 $16,391  
Italy  - 333 53.31% 0.038 1 2 0.12 $19,814  
Japan  2000 and 2002 1,771 46.80% 0.022 4 2 0.03 $36,616  
Malaysia  - 369 25.27% 0.066 4 4 0.05 $3,982  
Mexico  - 82 62.59% 0.049 1 0 0.03 $4,421  
Netherlands  - 101 57.80% 0.059 2 2 0.11 $24,802  
New Zealand  
- 
98 57.73% 0.073 4 3 0.06 $15,528  
Norway  - 130 58.94% 0.079 4 2 0.07 $33,844  
Peru  - 26 68.63% 0.058 3 0 0.07 $2,296  
Philippines  - 42 56.00% 0.08 3 0 0.18 $1,041  
Portugal  - 56 65.31% 0.036 3 1 0.06 $10,782  
Singapore  - 243 32.19% 0.064 4 4 0.06 $22,916  
South Africa  
- 
372 49.84% 0.061 5 3 0.02 $3,413  
South Korea  - 198 32.48% 0.051 2 3 0.06 $9,545  
Spain  - 338 64.08% 0.04 4 2 0.08 $14,535  
Sweden  1995 186 58.53% 0.067 3 2 0.16 $26,812  
Switzerland  - 38 57.67% 0.046 2 1 0.07 $37,908  
Taiwan  - 52 44.90% 0.039 3 2 0.06 $12,580  
Thailand  1999 83 43.95% 0.065 2 3 0.05 $2,396  
Turkey  - 17 50.00% 0.097 2 2 0.07 $2,810  
United 
Kingdom  
- 
5,624 58.61% 0.071 5 4 0.05 $21,767  
United States  
- 
17,491 59.07% 0.088 5 1 0.01 $30,899  
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Table 3.  Merger-level analysis: proportion of same-industry mergers 
The table presents the coefficient estimates from probit regressions. The dependent variable equals 1 if both acquirer and target are in the same 
industry, using 2-digit SIC code. A country is included in our sample if it has at least 50 qualified transactions over the sample period. A 
transaction is included if the percentage of acquired shares is at least 20%. Excluded are transactions where the acquirer is from the financial 
industry (SIC header 6) or regulated industry (SIC headers 48 and 49).  CRIGHTS are as of 1994. The control variables include shareholder rights, 
rule of law, macroeconomic risk, legal origins, the logarithm of the stock market capitalization, the index of flexibility to fire, the quality of 
accounting disclosure, an emerging market indicator, the logarithm of average real GDP-per-capita (1994-2000) in US$, the logarithm of 
transaction value, and the imputed leverage for the acquirer and the target (the predictors are the U.S. industry quartile rank of the median 
leverage and median tangibility, and all exogenous control variables). All variables are defined in Table 1. The regressions include year fixed 
effects (not reported). Models (1) through (5) include all countries. Model (6) excludes the U.S. Model (7) excludes both the U.S. and the U.K. 
The t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust estimation of standard errors with errors cluster-adjusted at the country level. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Sample period is 1994-2004. 
Variable All countries Exclude U.S.  
Exclude U.S. 
and U.K.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CRIGHTS -0.245***      -0.411***  -0.420***  
 (6.33)     (3.66) (3.56) 
AUTOSTAY  -0.415***        
  (5.74)       
REORG   -0.524***       
   (5.18)      
SECURED    -0.318***      
    (3.78)     
MANAGES     -0.848***     
     (6.89)    
SHRIGHTS 0.022 -0.002 0.012 0.029 0.143***  0.218***  0.112***  
 (0.91) (0.08) (0.46) (1.16) (5.38) (4.00) (2.88) 
Log (Market cap) 0.293***  0.247***  0.266***  0.207***  0.225***  0.134***  -0.035 
 (6.48) (5.94) (6.01) (5.56) (6.20) (3.09) (0.87) 
Flexibility to fire 0.836** 1.077***  1.37***  0.993** -0.262 0.503 -0.449 
 (2.15) (2.68) (3.32) (2.41) (0.67) (1.17) (0.94) 
Accounting 
disclosure -0.026***  -0.033***  -0.030***  -0.047***  -0.011** -0.024***  -0.035***  
 (4.46) (5.23) (4.82) (6.26) (2.21) (3.09) (4.31) 
Emerging Market 0.661***  0.421***  0.505***  0.303***  0.653***  1.932***  0.956** 
 (5.99) (4.75) (5.27) (4.25) (6.08) (3.42) (2.58) 
Rule of Law 0.375***  0.544***  0.362***  0.445***  0.026 0.952***  0.600***  
 (5.79) (7.85) (5.66) (6.87) (0.34) (4.13) (4.33) 
French Legal Origin -0.388***  -0.189* -0.305** -0.224** 0.0004 0.213 0.009 
 (2.87) (1.71) (2.52) (2.10) (0.01) (1.61) (0.07) 
German Legal Origin -0.613***  -0.86***  -0.950***  -0.968***  0.101 1.087** 0.673* 
 (9.32) (9.96) (10.58) (10.49) (1.00) (2.35) (1.69) 
Nordic Legal Origin 1.167***  0.903***  1.245***  1.097***  1.212***  2.458***  1.393** 
  (5.3) (4.49) (5.33) (5.10) (5.70) (3.33) (2.58) 
MacroRisk -0.207 -2.945***  -1.841** -6.312***  -0.803 4.755** 1.765 
 (0.22) (3.18) (1.96) (6.76) (0.97) (2.15) (1.13) 
Log(GDP perCapita)  -0.178***  -0.199***  -0.097** -0.055 -0.152***  -0.423***  -0.354***  
  (3.37) (3.71) (2.04) (1.20) (3.09) (3.13) (3.35) 
Log(Transaction 
Value) 0.086***  0.090***  0.091***  0.096***  0.083***  0.083** 0.064***  
 (5.41) (5.47) (5.47) (5.52) (5.30) (2.29) (2.85) 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Acquirer’s Leverage 
(imputed)  1.746* 1.755 1.734 1.737 1.754* -0.486 -1.376* 
 (1.69) (1.68) (1.64) (1.64) (1.70) (0.35) (1.75) 
Target’s Leverage 
(imputed)   -7.647***  -7.861***  -8.062***  -8.251***  -7.584***  -13.957***  -7.700** 
 (6.13) (6.14) (6.17) (6.17) (6.09) (3.51) (2.57) 
Number of countries 38 38 38 38 38 37 36 
Observations 33,221 33,221 33,221 33,221 33,221 15,730 10,106 
Chi-squared 4,449.7 4,279.3 1,696.8 1,375.8 5,870.4 1,838.4 2,079.4 
 
 
Table 4. Effects of creditor rights on performance for focusing and diversifying mergers. The table includes two performance variables: (1) 
dROA(k) = ROA(t+k)-ROA(t-1), where ROA is Return on Assets = EBITDA/ASSETS, and t is the year of the merger. (2) Cumulative abnormal 
returns on the acquirer’s stock, CAR, from 3 days before the merger announcement to 3 days after the merger announcement.  Abnormal returns 
are calculated from a market model whose parameters are estimated from weekly returns and market model for each country using 105 weeks but 
not less than 52 weeks, up to 9 weeks before the week of the merger announcement. We include year and industry fixed effects (not reported). To 
account for the choice of type of acquisition, we add the inverse Mill’s ratio, computed using probit model (1) in Table 3 for regressions that 
include all countries.  The t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors cluster-adjusted at the country level.  The ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 ROA(t+1) -ROA(t-1) ROA(t+2) -ROA(t-1) ROA(t+3) -ROA(t-1) CAR (t-3 to t+3) 
 Focusing Diversify Focusing Diversify Focusing Diversify Focusing Div. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CRIGHTS 0.0003 -0.028*** 0.026 -0.031*** -0.017 -0.030*** 0.011 -0.013*** 
  (0.02) (8.20) (1.30) (10.28) (0.98) (8.84) (1.65) (5.14) 
SRIGHTS 0.004 0.009 -0.008 -0.007 0.012 -0.003 -0.008* 0.002 
  (0.37) (1.44) (0.61) (1.27) (1.03) (0.45) (1.74) (0.56) 
0.001 -0.007 -0.019 -0.003 0.030 -0.002 -0.017** 0.004 Log(Market cap)  
 (0.11) (0.93) (0.90) (0.49) (1.49) (0.26) (2.31) (1.49) 
Flexibility to fire -0.124 0.041 -0.258 0.042 0.237 0.041 -0.173** -0.033 
  (0.77) (0.76) (1.03) (0.79) (1.11) (0.79) (2.41) (1.13) 
Accounting disclosure 0.001 0.0001 0.002 0.0003 -0.004* -0.001 0.002 -0.0001 
  (0.44) (0.06) (0.76) (0.26) (1.79) (0.79) (1.62) (0.18) 
Emerging markets 0.025 0.006 -0.078 0.008 0.103 0.002 -0.051** 0.022*** 
  (0.47) (0.38) (0.94) (0.48) (1.43) (0.13) (2.2) (2.89) 
Rule of Law -0.021 -0.019 -0.079 0.019 0.062 0.016 -0.058 0.02* 
  (0.44) (0.69) (1.06) (0.92) (1.02) (0.82) (1.53) (1.87) 
French Legal Origin 0.037 -0.026 -0.034 -0.021 0.065 -0.025 -0.032 0.019 
  (0.86) (1.34) (0.50) (1.34) (1.35) (1.39) (1.28) (1.66) 
German Legal Origin 0.055 0.003 0.079 0.005 -0.062 -0.006 0.049* 0.013** 
  (1.35) (0.27) (1.13) (0.44) (1.16) (0.53) (1.96) (2.34) 
Nordic Legal Origin 0.020 -0.024 -0.145* -0.026 0.093 -0.021 -0.047** 0.047*** 
  (0.42) (0.85) (1.84) (1.02) (1.23) (0.72) (2.32) (2.98) 
MacroRisk 0.105 -0.169 0.780 -0.619*** -0.427 -0.161 0.279 -0.058 
  (0.27) (1.0) (1.09) (4.08) (1.04) (0.92) (1.45) (0.63) 
Log GDP per capita 0.001 0.013 0.022 -0.012 -0.006 -0.009 0.015 -0.02** 
  (0.13) (0.85) (1.06) (0.95) (0.4) (0.73) (1.10) (2.22) 
Log(Transaction Value) -0.002 -0.003 -0.009 -0.003 0.009 -0.001 -0.005 0.002*** 
  (0.37) (0.95) (0.93) (0.72) (1.21) (0.3) (1.32) (2.66) 
Dummy: Target is public  0.004 -0.005 0.011 -0.001 0.006 -0.003 -0.016*** -0.017** 
  (0.63) (1.57) (1.29) (0.39) (1.25) (0.78) (5.01) (2.48) 
Inverse Mill's Ratio -0.082 0.040 -0.573 0.053 0.618 0.092* -0.434** 0.014 
  (0.21) (1.08) (0.9) (1.08) (1.25) (1.96) (2.01) (0.65) 
Observations 8,788 5,752 8,198 5,491 7,742 4,770 7,500 5,725 
R-squared 8.8% 11.7% 8.5% 15.0% 4.2% 13.6% 1.6% 2.0% 
Table 5. Cash flow risk and creditor rights: RISK at firm level  
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The dependent variable, industry-adjusted RISK, is the standard deviation of the firm’s annual ROA defined as EBITDA/ASSETS (see definition in 
Table 1) minus that year’s median industry ROA (2-digit SIC code).  The sample period is 1992-2005. Included are companies from the 
manufacturing industry only (SIC 2000 – 3999).  We present the second stage estimation from the 2SLS system where we treat firm leverage as 
endogenous. We instrument leverage with the quartile ranks of the U.S. industry median leverage and tangibility. The t-statistics (in parentheses) 
are based on robust standard errors cluster-adjusted at the country level.  The ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Variable All countries Exclude U.S. 
Exclude U.S. 
and U.K. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CRIGHTS -0.006***      -0.006***  -0.006***  
 (2.75)     (2.67) (2.69) 
AUTOSTAY  -0.011      
  (1.52)      
REORG   -0.005     
   (0.84)     
SECURED    -0.006    
    (1.15)    
MANAGES     -0.022***    
     (3.74)   
SHRIGHTS -0.005 -0.005* -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005* 
 (1.61) (1.80) (1.16) (1.29) (1.22) (1.62) (1.89) 
Log (Market cap) 0.006***  0.007***  0.006***  0.006***  0.006***  0.003 0.003 
 (3.10) (3.04) (2.64) (2.76) (3.59) (1.21) (0.74) 
Flexibility to fire 0.066***  0.075***  0.081***  0.077***  0.041* 0.06***  0.055***  
 (3.22) (3.73) (3.69) (3.75) (1.93) (3.03) (2.69) 
Accounting disclosure -0.001 -0.001 -0.0005 -0.001 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 
 (1.17) (1.17) (0.96) (1.08) (0.64) (0.66) (0.74) 
Emerging Market 0.011 0.007 0.001 -0.001 0.014* 0.012 0.009 
 (1.30) (0.71) (0.10) (0.15) (1.83) (1.52) (1.00) 
Rule of Law 0.010 0.012 0.005 0.005 -0.001 0.012 0.013 
 (0.98) (0.91) (0.47) (0.43) (0.13) (1.35) (1.26) 
French Legal Origin -0.036***  -0.034***  -0.032***  -0.033***  -0.03***  -0.037***  -0.037***  
 (4.00) (3.73) (3.49) (3.67) (2.88) (4.45) (4.38) 
German Legal Origin -0.024***  -0.029***  -0.029***  -0.029***  -0.010 -0.025***  -0.022** 
 (3.41) (3.95) (4.08) (4.31) (1.14) (2.67) (2.14) 
Nordic Legal Origin -0.016 -0.021* -0.02* -0.02* -0.012 -0.021** -0.021* 
 (1.45) (1.84) (1.70) (1.73) (0.98) (2.04) (1.91) 
MacroRisk 0.101 0.086 0.096 0.081 0.116 0.100* 0.109* 
 (1.67) (1.30) (1.45) (1.27) (1.56) (1.73) (1.74) 
Log GDP per capita 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.002 0.0004 
 (0.68) (0.61) (1.26) (1.26) (0.87) (0.53) (0.09) 
Leverage (Instrumented) -0.145***  -0.151***  -0.153***  -0.157***  -0.150***  -0.125***  -0.149***  
 (4.17) (4.01) (3.85) (3.64) (4.15) (3.28) (3.06) 
Log(Initial total assets) -0.010** -0.01** -0.01** -0.010** -0.01** -0.006***  -0.004** 
 (2.55) (2.46) (2.45) (2.39) (2.45) (3.32) (2.53) 
Observations 5,394 5,394 5,394 5,394 5,394 3,812 3,385 
Centered R-squared 49.7% 48.2% 47.9% 46.9% 48.7% 52.9% 49.8% 
Number of countries 35 35 35 35 35 34 33 
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Table 6. Leverage and creditor rights: leverage at firm level  
The dependent variable is industry-adjusted leverage, defined as leverage (defined in Table 1) minus that year’s median industry leverage (2-digit 
SIC code).  The sample period is 1992-2005.  The estimation includes year fixed effects. Included are companies from the manufacturing industry 
only (SIC 2000 – 3999).  Data requirements are as for Table 5, and there are 35 countries. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on robust 
standard errors cluster-adjusted at the country level.  The ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 All countries Exclude U.S. Exclude U.S. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CRIGHTS -0.022***     -0.017*** -0.018*** 
 (5.20)     (3.65) (3.42) 
AUTOSTAY  -0.037**      
  (2.45)      
REORG   -0.049***     
   (4.66)     
SECURED    -0.042**    
    (2.61)    
MANAGES     -0.041***   
     (3.10)   
SHRIGHTS -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.005 -0.009* -0.006 -0.009** -0.009** 
 (3.15) (2.96) (1.37) (1.71) (1.48) (2.57) (2.61) 
Log (Market cap) 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.021*** 0.013** 0.003 0.002 
 (2.96) (3.22) (3.52) (3.44) (2.31) (0.43) (0.34) 
Flexibility to fire -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.001* 
 (1.88) (0.75) (0.99) (0.64) (1.22) (1.76) (1.71) 
Accounting disclosure -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.003** -0.003*** 
 (3.89) (4.43) (4) (4.32) (3.24) (2.57) (2.72) 
Emerging Market 0.058** 0.046 0.053* 0.052 0.029 0.032 0.035 
 (2.14) (1.4) (1.76) (1.48) (0.95) (1.61) (1.57) 
Rule of Law 0.062*** 0.057** 0.066*** 0.07** 0.013 0.047** 0.05** 
 (2.76) (2.08) (2.9) (2.04) (0.39) (1.98) (2.12) 
French Legal Origin -0.039** -0.035 -0.009 -0.020 -0.030 -0.032** -0.032** 
 (2.23) (1.67) (0.73) (1.06) (1.38) (2.14) (2.13) 
German Legal Origin -0.074*** -0.098*** -0.087*** -0.092*** -0.063*** -0.05** -0.048** 
 (9.02) (9.46) (8.93) (9.18) (4.01) (2.37) (2.24) 
Nordic Legal Origin 0.030 0.024 0.052*** 0.055* 0.027 0.014 0.016 
 (1.42) (0.98) (2.82) (1.92) (0.97) (0.74) (0.85) 
MacroRisk -0.101 -0.177 -0.134 -0.35** -0.145 -0.120 -0.116 
 (0.78) (1.08) (1.11) (2.3) (1.05) (1.02) (0.95) 
Log GDP per capita -0.017 -0.011 -0.012 -0.010 -0.002 -0.023** -0.024** 
 (1.31) (0.72) (0.95) (0.69) (0.13) (2.25) (2.31) 
Country Corporate Taxes -0.001* -0.001 -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (1.75) (1.29) (2.07) (0.97) (1.13) (1.04) (1.08) 
Tangibility (t-1) 0.188*** 0.186*** 0.184*** 0.188*** 0.189*** 0.176*** 0.186*** 
 (10.67) (10.62) (10.35) (10.97) (10.81) (6.3) (6.12) 
Log(assets, in US$) (t-1) 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
 (7.55) (7.46) (7.66) (7.37) (7.35) (8.75) (7.83) 
EBITDA/ Assets (t-1) -0.155*** -0.156*** -0.154*** -0.159*** -0.158*** -0.157*** -0.177*** 
 (9.20) (9.26) (9.26) (9.71) (9.27) (3.36) (3.40) 
Observations 36,237 36,237 36,237 36,237 36,237 18,920 17,297 
R-squared 17.4% 17.0% 17.4% 16.9% 17.1% 20.6% 20.2% 
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Table 7. Recovery rates and mergers and acquisitions 
The table presents coefficient estimates of probit models. The dependent variable equals 1 if Prob(TH∩AL|TH) = 1, i.e., if the target is in a high-
recovery industry and the acquirer is in a low-recovery industry. The universe is all target firms in high recovery industry. Included are all 
transactions where the percentage of acquired shares is at least 20%. Excluded are transactions involving acquirers that are financial industry (SIC 
header 6) or regulated industry companies (SIC headers 48 and 49). The following industries are classified as low recovery (2-SIC code headers): 
transportation (37, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47), high technology and office equipment (35, 36, 38), consumer/ service sector (52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 
58, 59, 72, 73, 75, 76, 78, 79), or leisure time/ media (27, 48, 70). The following industries are classified as high recovery (2-SIC code headers): 
energy and natural resources (10, 12, 13, 14, 24), building products/ homebuilders (8, 15, 17, 24, 28, 29, 32, 34), or healthcare/ chemicals (28, 
80). This classification follows Acharya, Bharath and Srinivasan (2007).  All variables are defined in Table 1. The leverage of acquirer and target 
are calculated as in Table 3. The sample period is 1994-2004. The absolute values of the t-statistics are shown in parentheses below the 
coefficients and are based on robust standard errors that are cluster-adjusted at the country level. We include a year fixed effect (not reported). ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, correspondingly. 
All countries Excluding the U.S. & U.K. Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
CRIGHTS 
 
0.128** 
(2.45)     
0.354*** 
(4.56)     
AUTOSTAY 
  
0.915*** 
(6.30)     
0.425** 
(2.38)    
REORG 
   
0.277* 
(1.93)     
0.492*** 
(2.64)   
SECURED 
    
0.124 
(0.60)     
0.51** 
(2.33)  
MANAGES 
     
0.619*** 
(3.50)     
1.466*** 
(5.25) 
SHRIGHTS 
 
-0.107* 
(1.65) 
0.016 
(0.22) 
-0.114* 
(1.71) 
-0.118 
(1.54) 
-0.22*** 
(2.71) 
-0.18*** 
(3.32) 
-0.191*** 
(2.81) 
-0.165** 
(2.33) 
-0.211*** 
(3.35) 
-0.357*** 
(5.81) 
Log (Market 
cap) 
0.083 
(1.17) 
-0.615*** 
(6.49) 
0.12* 
(1.86) 
0.165** 
(2.27) 
0.116* 
(1.90) 
0.283*** 
(2.94) 
0.25** 
(2.13) 
0.205** 
(2.05) 
0.081 
(0.66) 
0.416*** 
(3.47) 
Flexibility to 
fire 
-1.250 
(1.34) 
-2.379** 
(2.32) 
-1.716 
(1.52) 
-1.305 
(0.99) 
-0.274 
(0.33) 
-0.497 
(0.67) 
-1.108 
(1.12) 
-1.496 
(1.67) 
-1.456 
(1.21) 
1.86** 
(2.16) 
Accounting 
disclosure 
-0.05*** 
(3.73) 
0.018 
(1.15) 
-0.045*** 
(3.38) 
-0.034*** 
(3.05) 
-0.056*** 
(4.51) 
-0.035*** 
(3.23) 
-0.039*** 
(3.12) 
-0.039*** 
(3.6) 
-0.036*** 
(3.45) 
-0.048*** 
(5.23) 
Emerging 
Markets 
-0.162 
(1.02) 
-1.138*** 
(5.69) 
-0.059 
(0.49) 
0.027 
(0.21) 
-0.259 
(1.68) 
-0.453 
(1.47) 
-0.492 
(1.44) 
-0.345 
(0.99) 
-0.84** 
(2.31) 
-0.157 
(0.49) 
Rule of Law 
 
0.190 
(1.01) 
-0.56** 
(2.33) 
0.225 
(1.18) 
0.161 
(0.76) 
0.424** 
(2.05) 
0.186 
(0.81) 
-0.209 
(0.8) 
0.107 
(0.44) 
-0.145 
(0.55) 
0.909*** 
(3.15) 
French Legal 
Origin 
-0.405 
(1.44) 
0.317 
(1.04) 
-0.418 
(1.52) 
-0.538 
(1.59) 
-0.72*** 
(2.69) 
-0.330 
(1.09) 
-0.849** 
(2.49) 
-0.579 
(1.63) 
-0.707** 
(2.14) 
-0.774** 
(2.57) 
German Legal 
Origin 
-0.257** 
(2.08) 
1.483*** 
(9.38) 
-0.099 
(0.94) 
-0.084 
(0.62) 
-0.871*** 
(3.57) 
-1.118*** 
(3.65) 
-1.017*** 
(2.70) 
-0.578 
(1.32) 
-0.868* 
(1.90) 
-2.025*** 
(6.15) 
Nordic Legal 
Origin  
0.733** 
(2.00) 
-2.317*** 
(4.46) 
0.817** 
(2.26) 
0.982** 
(2.08) 
0.670* 
(1.79) 
0.156 
(0.35) 
0.289 
(0.58) 
0.112 
(0.25) 
-0.218 
(0.48) 
0.279 
(0.57) 
MacroRisk 
 
5.734* 
(1.94) 
9.374*** 
(3.01) 
6.488** 
(2.42) 
9.048*** 
(3.92) 
4.761 
(1.68) 
3.149 
(1.15) 
5.129* 
(1.7) 
5.223** 
(1.99) 
5.228* 
(1.79) 
4.462 
(1.6) 
Log GDP per 
capita 
0.249* 
(1.75) 
0.600*** 
(3.47) 
0.173 
(1.29) 
0.156 
(0.99) 
0.272** 
(1.98) 
0.3** 
(2.32) 
0.363** 
(2.09) 
0.211 
(1.57) 
0.222 
(1.25) 
0.249** 
(2.05) 
Log 
(Transaction 
Value) 
0.015 
(1.49) 
-0.136*** 
(6.45) 
0.017* 
(1.70) 
0.019* 
(1.95) 
0.017* 
(1.7) 
0.073*** 
(3.11) 
0.076*** 
(3.23) 
0.077*** 
(3.22) 
0.074*** 
(3.14) 
0.085*** 
(3.65) 
Acquirer’s 
Leverage 
(imputed) 
-12.99*** 
(9.47) 
-26.83*** 
(7.03) 
-12.88*** 
(9.25) 
-12.71*** 
(9.08) 
-12.96*** 
(9.4) 
-15.25*** 
(12.8) 
-14.80*** 
(12.65) 
-14.84*** 
(12.04) 
-14.72*** 
(11.71) 
-15.17*** 
(12.37) 
Target’s 
Leverage 
(imputed) 
5.838*** 
(9.03) 
32.688*** 
(14.58) 
5.658*** 
(8.66) 
5.342*** 
(7.66) 
5.762*** 
(8.83) 
10.807*** 
(7.75) 
10.217*** 
(7.22) 
10.046*** 
(6.62) 
9.833*** 
(6.93) 
10.133*** 
(7.45) 
# of countries 38 38 38 38 38 36 36 36 36 36 
Observations 6,495 6,495 6,495 6,495 6,495 2,599 2,599 2,599 2,599 2,599 
Chi-squared 28,376.0 6,360.2 43,325.1 13,403.8 12,529.0 27,974.7 6,449.9 15,708.8 9,494.0 13,115.9 
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Table 8.  The effect of changes in Creditor rights 
The creditor rights change dummy, ΔCRIGHTS, equals one after the year of change from a period of stronger creditor rights and zero otherwise, 
and it equals zero after the year of change from a period of weaker creditor rights, and one otherwise.  It equals zero for the control sample of no 
change in creditor rights. Included are all merger and acquisitions where the acquired percentage shares is at least 20%, the transaction has a 
disclosed value, and the time changes in creditor rights are available in Djankov et al. (2007). We exclude transactions where the acquirer is in the 
financial industry (SIC header 6) or regulated industry (SIC headers 48 and 49).  The sample period is 1994-2004.  Models (1), (2) and (8) are 
estimated by the probit method and the rest are estimated by OLS.  The dummy variable to measure the probability of same-industry acquisition, 
Pr(SAME), equals 1 when bidder and target are in the same industry. The dummy variable to measure the probability of an acquisition of high-
recovery target by a low-recover acquirer, Pr(AL∩TH|TH), equals 1 when, among all acquisitions of target firms whose assets have high recovery 
value, the bidder firm’s assets have low recovery value. For regression (2) only, we include all cross-country and within-country mergers that meet 
the requirements above. The post-acquisition change in return on assets is dROA(k) = ROA(t+k) – ROA(t-1), where k = 1, 2, or 3, calculated for 
each merger with available data, where t is the effective year of the merger. CAR is the cumulative abnormal returns on the acquirer stock from 3 
days before the acquisition announcement to 3 days after it. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets in book value. The t-statistics are in 
parentheses. The standard errors are cluster-adjusted at the country level. Included (but not reported for brevity) are fixed effects for country, year 
and industry (2-digit SIC code – acquirer’s industry for models (1) through (6)), following the difference-in-differences methodology of Bertrand, 
Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004). Model (8) does not include industry fixed effects, in line with Table 7. *** , **, and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Part I. Mutivariate Analysis 
Variable 
Pr(Same- 
Industry) 
Pr(Same-
Country) dROA(1) dROA(2) dROA(3) 
CAR 
 (t-3 to t+3) Leverage 
Prob(TH ∩ 
AL|TH) 
         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ΔCRIGHTS c,t -0.145*** 
 
-0.213*** -0.042*** -0.051*** -0.023*** -0.005** -0.035** 0.147 
 (6.19) (2.83) (5.78) (9.22) (4.93) (3.31) (2.53) (1.08) 
Log (Transaction Value) 0.028* -0.07
** -0.002* -0.002 -0.001* -0.001 - -0.057 
 (2.52) (2.22) (1.75) (1.03) (1.73) (1.07)  (7.73) 
Tangibilityt-1 - - - - - - 0.174*** - 
       (9.83)  
Log(assets, in US$ t-1 - - - - - - 0.019*** - 
       (7.11)  
EBITDA/ Assetst-1 - - - - - - -0.163*** - 
       (10.16)  
Fixed Effects 
Country, 
year, 
industry  
Country, 
year, 
industry 
Country, 
year, 
industry 
Country, 
year, 
industry 
Country, 
year, 
industry 
Country, 
year, 
industry 
Country, 
year, 
industry 
Country, 
year 
 
Observations 33,221 52,756 14,540 13,689 12,512 13,225 36,237 6,495 
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Figure 1. Timeline of the model. 
 
 
   H
Type turns out  
to be high  > F 
0.5 
Management 
type is 
revealed 
Failure to 
reorganize 
t=0 t=1 
0.5 
Type is low 
Manager 
dismissed  
Liquidation r 
q 
(1-q-r) 
1-p(y) 
p(y) 
0 
y 
Continuation 
0.5 
0.5 
Management 
type is not 
revealed Type turns out 
to be low  
0 < F 
Continuation 
H > F Type is high 
Liquidation 
L < F 
  L < F 
Default and Reorganization/Liquidation 
With remaining 
probability (1-q-r), 
management type 
remains uncertain 
and firm is continued. 
 
If type turns out to be 
high, the output is H. 
Otherwise, it is 0.  
With probability q, 
managerial type is 
revealed during 
investigation. 
 
If type is low (probability 
0.5), the firm is efficiently 
liquidated and 
management suffers a 
private cost of m. 
Otherwise, it is continued. 
With probability r, 
creditors of the firm fail 
to reach any 
agreement to 
reorganize and firm is 
liquidated. 
Management suffers a 
private cost of m.  
 
Otherwise, managerial 
type is investigated. 
Manager chooses 
the riskiness of the 
leveraged firm, y. 
 
The firm has debt of 
face value F 
payable next 
period.  
h 
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Figure 2. The share of same-industry mergers in a country, SAME, and creditor rights, CRIGHTS. 
The fitted line represents the slope from a Tobit regression of the fraction of same industry mergers in a country on aconstant and 
the creditor rights index. The slope coefficient is -0.043 with t = 3.94. 
 
ARG
AUS
AUT
BEL
BRA
CAN
CHE
CHL
DEUNK
ESP
FIN
FRA GBR
GRC
HKG
IDN
IND
IRL
ISR
ITA
JPN
KOR
MEX
MYS
NLDNOR NZL
PER
PHL
PRT
SGP
SWE
THA
TUR
TWN
USA
ZAF
.2
.4
.6
.8
0 1 2 3 4
Creditor Rights
 
 
 
 60
